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ABSTRACT 
 
Vietnam is an economy in transition that has encountered a great deal of obstacles and issues 
shifting to the market tract. Due to a lack of synchronized legal systems, and the legacy of 
stagnant economic development and low efficiency dating from the wartime, it has been even 
more difficult for Vietnam to adapt itself to the new context of globalization. Since Doimoi 
however, Vietnam has witnessed gradual but important changes in thinking and action. In order 
to apply the model of “socialist market-oriented economy” in practice, Vietnam enacted the 
Vietnam Competition Law (VCL) in 2004. After nearly a decade of being in force, the VCL 
(2004) has attracted lots of critique over its outdated and inappropriate content. In contrast, a 
number of comments from economic experts and academia still express supportive attitudes and 
highly appreciate the introduction of the law in 2004. Competition-related issues are now an 
important concern in the domestic market and the law has strengthened Vietnam’s integration 
into the regional and global economy.  
 
This thesis identifies the factors determining the promulgation of the VCL (2004). It argues 
factors came from both internal and external sites. Changes in economic political thinking and 
negative experience in the national economy for a long period are found to be the main forces 
for the promulgation from a domestic perspective. While entering a number of regional 
organizations like ASEAN and APEC and indirect pressure from application for entrance into 
the WTO and negotiation with the U.S. under the Bilateral Trade Agreement are the main forces 
from an external perspective. The thesis shows how both external and internal factors 
contributed to and interacted with each other in the enactment of the VCL (2004). It finds these 
forces were harmonized in a way that met Vietnam’s international obligations and desire for 
deeper integration with the global economy while also meeting the requirements of competition 
law in a transitional economy. These findings suggest further study on the process of 
harmonization of external and internal forces in the area of competition policy is needed to 
understand better the process of introducing competition policy in transitional economies. 
 
 4 
 
ABBREVIATIONS 
 
AANZFTA ASEAN Australia New Zealand Free Trade Agreement 
AEC ASEAN Economic Community 
AFCCP Agency for Fair Competition and Consumer Protection 
AFTA ASEAN Free Trade Area 
AMS ASEAN Member States 
APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation 
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asia Nations 
BTA Bilateral Trade Agreement 
CCS Competition Commission of Singapore 
CFTC Chinese Taipei Fair Trade Commission 
CIS Commonwealth Independent States 
EATOP East Asia Top Officials Program on competition policy 
FTA Free Trade Agreement 
IMF International Monetary Fund 
IP Intellectual Property 
JFTC Japan Fair Trade Commission 
KFTC Korea Fair Trade Commission 
KPPU Komisi Pengawas Persaingan Usaha (Commission for 
Supervision of Business Competition) 
M&A Merger and Acquisition 
MOFCOM, NDRC, 
SAIC 
Ministry of Commerce, National Development and Reform 
Commission, State Administration of Industry and Commerce 
(China) 
MOIT Ministry of Industry and Trade (of Vietnam) 
MOT Ministry of Trade (of Vietnam) 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
OTCC Office of Trade Competition Commission (Thailand) 
RBP Restrictive Business Practice 
RTA Regional Free Trade Agreement 
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SOEs State Owned Enterprises 
STAR Support for Trade Acceleration (Project) 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
VCL Vietnam Competition Law 
WTO World Trade Organization 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In an economic sense, competition can be simply understood as the rivalry among firms in 
selling goods and services to consumers. Firms here might compete in terms of price or product 
quality where competition generally results in market entry or exit. In particular, a competitive 
market is one that attracts more and more new companies entering the market. However, a 
market witnessing severe competition will drive small companies with less competitive 
advantage out of that market. 
 
Though competition sounds reasonable by its nature, it has not naturally existed in any type of 
economy throughout the development of the world’s major national economies. Similarly, there 
was no competition in Vietnam’s economy during the period of central planning where state 
intervention “surrogated” any “growing seed” of competition. 
 
Vietnam has not been an exception to the evolution of global economic development in general 
and the expansion/importation of “competition law” in particular. From the perspective of 
policy and law makers in Vietnam, the enactment of the Vietnam Competition Law (VCL) in 
2004 marked a breakthrough in new economic thinking from the think tank elite that attached 
significance and necessity to the promotion of competition as part of the open market policy – a 
crucial component of the Doimoi (or reform) policy since 1986. In that sense, the evolution of 
competition policy in Vietnam has very much been a bottom up process. 
 
Taking a broader view however, this explanation is not enough and cannot reflect exactly how 
the enactment of competition law was affected by other elements outside of the domestic reform 
agenda. This thesis will therefore explore the story of how the VCL (2004) came into effect by 
integrating the backdrop of changes and the context of the national economy at that time with 
the external driving forces before and in the process of drafting the law. The thesis asks, “How 
were the external driving forces harmonized with the internal ones towards the enactment of the 
VCL (2004)?” 
 
The major conclusions are the VCL (2004) was born to meet the actual requirements of the 
national economic political context in parallel with responding to the implicit pressures from 
the Bilateral Trade Agreement with the U.S and the application for WTO membership. Also, it 
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should be emphasized that this harmonization occurred in the wave of expanding competition 
law and policy over the world since 1980s. Overall, the study shows that the process of enacting 
competition law in Vietnam was neither exclusively bottom-up/internally driven nor top 
down/externally driven, rather, both internal and external influences played critical roles in the 
shaping of policy outcomes. 
 
This thesis will not touch upon which model of competition law the Vietnam Competition Law 
(VCL) resembles or follows or even the process of drafting the law. Instead, the major focus is 
on the question “How competition law came to Vietnam in the early 2000s?” The thesis 
explores the external and internal driving forces linked with Vietnam’s economic integration. 
 
This study also draws some general lessons and experiences for other developing countries or 
economies in transition like Vietnam when drafting their competition law as a response to the 
actual domestic needs of the economy at the same time as managing impacts from external 
influences.  
 
Before touching on the structure of approaches applied in the thesis and the scope of research, 
three distinct but easily confused definitions of competition, competition law and competition 
policy are required. 
 
First, according to the Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law 
from the OECD, “competition refers to a situation in a market in which firms or sellers 
independently strive for the patronage of buyers in order to achieve a particular business 
objective, e.g., profits, sales and/or market share”.1 
 
In the modern era, competition is recognized worldwide as being part of any economic activity 
as it gives impetus for growth, promotes production, increases efficiency and makes socio-
economic relations healthy. As in other sectors and from the viewpoint of constructing a legal 
corridor for implementing competition in reality, laws defining competition are of great 
importance to the functioning of a modern economy. 
 
                                                 
1
 Glossary of Industrial Organization Economics and Competition Law, compiled by R.S.Khemani and D.M. 
Shapiro, commissioned by the Directorate for Financial, Fiscal and Enterprise Affairs, OECD, 1993. 
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Second, “National competition law can be defined as the set of rules and disciplines maintained 
by governments relating either to agreements between firms that restrict competition or to the 
abuse of a dominant position”.2 Thus, competition policy disciplines constrain both private and 
government actions, whereas antitrust [competition] rules pertain to the behavior of private 
entities (firms).
3
 
 
Finally, and overall, competition policy is therefore “the set of policies and laws which ensure 
that competition in the marketplace is not restricted in such a way as to reduce economic 
welfare”.4 Obviously then, competition policy has a much broader domain5 and competition 
law is one component of that bigger “circle”. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While sectorial (or industrial) regulations/laws help to create competition among businesses 
operating in the entire economy, competition law contributes to maintain competition in the 
entire market. This shows high interaction between competition law and other regulatory laws 
as well as the significant role of competition law in a market economy. To some extent, 
                                                 
2
 Bernard Hoekman and Peter Holmes (1999). Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO. The World 
Economy. 22 (6), 875–893, p.876. 
3
 Bernard Hoekman, Petros C. Mavroidis (2002). Economic Development, Competition Policy, and the World 
Trade Organization. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 2917. p4. 
4
 Massimo Motta (2004). Competition Policy Theory and Practice. New York. Cambridge University Press. 12
th
 
printing 2009. p30. 
5
 Bernard Hoekman and Peter Holmes (1999). Competition Policy, Developing Countries and the WTO. The World 
Economy. 22 (6), 875–893. p876. 
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regulatory laws are necessary conditions and competition law is the sufficient condition for 
building and preserving a sound competition policy. 
 
The chart below sets out the relationship between competition law, competition policy and 
economic development. The close linkage once again confirms the fundamental and important 
role of competition law in the overall picture of economic development via its direct effects and 
indirect effects witnessed through the harmonization and interaction of other sectorial 
regulations. 
 
Source: UNCTAD Secretariat (2010). “The role of competition policy in promoting economic development: The 
appropriate design and effectiveness of competition law and policy”. Sixth United Nations Conference to Review 
all aspects of the Set of Multilaterally Agreed Equitable Principles and Rules for the Control of Restrictive 
Business Practices. p12. 
After nearly ten years of promulgating the VCL, the law has exhibited a lot of loopholes 
creating obstacles to the investigating agency and the case handling council. While this is an 
area of further study, this thesis will not focus on this aspect of the VCL. Instead, the scope of 
study is restricted to the story of the Competition Law Project,
6
 which was responsible for 
                                                 
6
 In Vietnam, before any law is finally adopted by the National Assembly, it is often called a [specific name] law 
project. This refers to a long time period of “producing” a law since the first day when the host Ministry/State 
agency submits the official letter to the Government about the plan to draft and issue a law (this letter covers a lot 
of explanation but focuses on the necessity of enacting the law, the tentative structure of the law) to the drafting 
process, launching to drafted versions to multi stakeholders for comments and contribution, submitting the final 
draft to the National Assembly for adoption.  
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drafting the law, dating back to early 2000s, and to analyzing the major internal and external 
drivers of that process. 
 
The thesis employs an analytical, comparative synthetic approach to assess data, information 
and practices. The thesis will be structured into three chapters. The first one will review the 
literature on analyzing the factors accounting for adoption of competition law. Chapter two will 
spend one part on the background of economic situation and changes in Vietnamese economic 
policies from 1986 to 2000 to tease out the domestic incentives leading to the Competition Law 
Project. The other part of this chapter will focus on the evolution of competition law in the 
world and the region and pick several breakthrough events including Vietnam entering ASEAN, 
APEC and application for WTO membership as well as conclusion of the Vietnam-US Bilateral 
Trade Agreement to assess how external factors drove the adoption of the VCL (2004). The 
final chapter puts forward a comparative and accumulative evaluation of the divergence and 
convergence between the domestic and external impacts on the enactment of the VCL (2004) in 
order to test whether harmonization worked. The conclusion will restate the overall picture of 
how the VCL (2004) was enacted in Vietnam and summarize the finding on how internal and 
external factors interacted in the establishment of competition policy in Vietnam. 
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CHAPTER I 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
I. Factors influencing the enactment of international competition law 
 
There is little research on the factors affecting the enactment of a Competition Law in 
developing countries. Competition issues and Competition Law itself have been proliferating in 
the world since the 1980s. The current literature on enacting a competition act in developing 
countries however remains largely understudied partly due to the fact that prior to 1980, 
Antitrust Law was mostly constructed and implemented in developed countries. These countries 
were then facing the enormous wave of economic globalization and world trade liberalization. 
As part of this wave, developing countries tended to learn from the predecessors when looking 
for legislation to regulate competition in domestic activities. They did so to assure the efficient 
operation of the market and to preserve a fair competition environment for all businesses within 
their territories. However, from this starting point competition was predominantly seen as a 
domestic story. Following this, multinational companies and cross-border missions (cartels, 
mergers, etc) pushed competition to become a multinational issue. These dual forces have 
meant that not only enforcement of a competition law can be extremely tough after adoption but 
that even getting to the point of having a competition law is a real challenge. Promulgation of 
comprehensive law must therefore account for both the internal and external influences and 
interests. This chapter reviews the literature on the factors accounting for the adoption of 
competition law from the perspective of developing countries. 
 
Edwards (1967) conducted a comprehensive research on “Control of Cartels and Monopolies: 
An International Comparison” which digs down into the adoption and practice of competition 
laws over the period 1945-1964. During that period, there were only 24 countries “engaged 
seriously in efforts to control restrictive practices by law” and 3 more countries passed 
competition laws up to 1973.
7
 More recently, a number of journal articles, reports and 
conferences on the development of competition laws have studied specific regions and some 
selected economies.  
 
                                                 
7
 Edwards (1967) cited in Palim, Mark R A (1998). The worldwide growth of competition law: An empirical 
analysis. Antitrust Bulletin; Srping 1998; 43, 1. p107. 
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Chart 1: Increase in the number of countries with Competition Law around the world 
prior 2004 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: own calculation from data available at Palim (1998) & Kronthaler and Stephan (2007) 
 
The majority of this research was conducted by the OECD, UNCTAD and the EU and 
published as legal bulletins or introduced as working papers. This is to say that by the late 
1990s, the literature on all relevant topics on competition law was modest and scattered in the 
absence of comprehensive and in-depth research. Among those, Palim (1998) was one of the 
only using econometric methods (in other words, using quantitative studies of economic 
variables) in addition to other studies providing information about factors affecting the 
decisions involved in constructing a competition law.
8
 
 
According to Palim (1998), the most common [classic] explanations for a country to initiate the 
competition law project at that time included three hypotheses: (i) economic reform; (ii) 
political liberalization and (iii) level of development. Transferring from direct management of 
the economy to the increasing reliance on the market was the most cited reason for the growth 
                                                 
8
 Kronthaler Franz; Stephan Johannes (2007). Factors accounting for the enactment of a competition law – an 
empirical analysis. Antitrust Bulletin; Summer; Vol. 52, No.2. pp137-168. 
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in competition policy and regulation in the world.
9
 In order to test the renewed interest in 
competition law, Palim employed two approaches to measuring those three variables: (i) using 
aggregate measures of economic reform and political liberalization; (ii) using variables for 
individual institutions and events. Consequently, Palim came up with the key factors imbued in 
economic development and economic reforms as response to the period 1980-1996 (the so-
called booming period of competition law). 
 
In the first approach, Palim picked the period of 1980-1995(6) with the dependent variable as 
competition law; the independent variables as political change, economic change, level of 
development. The regression supported the conclusion that “adoption of a competition law is 
positively and significantly associated with increased economic freedom and with a higher level 
of development”.10 To confirm the result of the test, Palim also picked a sub-period of 1990-
1996 for testing to cross check the first regression. The second regression showed the same 
outcome.  
 
As for Palim’s second approach, the dependent variable was the same while the only 
independent variable that was the same was economic development. Palim also employed other 
underlying events and institutional models such as the EU single market, debt crisis,
11
 and 
collapse of Soviet Union.
12
 The third regression pointed to the same conclusion: 
“There is empirical support for the hypotheses in the literature that the recent 
interest in competition law is associated with economic development and 
economic reform, although there is not support for the hypothesis that political 
liberalization plays a role in the recent resurgence in competition law.”13 
Using Palim’s 1998 study, Kronthaler & Stephan (2007) developed the results and expanded the 
set of hypotheses and used panel data to test more factors accounting for the enactment a 
competition law. They drew a new finding about factors influencing the decision to enact a 
competition law. They found that during the period 1991-2000, twenty-seven of a total thirty-
eight countries in the world that adopted competition law for the first time were developing 
                                                 
9
 Palim, Mark R A (1998), p111-2. 
10
 Palim, Mark R A (1998), p117. 
11
 Palim suggested that competition law was one of the microeconomic reforms undertaken following the debt 
crisis. 
12
 The collapse of the Soviet Union resulted in the transition from the central planning economy to a market 
economy. 
13
 Palim, Mark R A (1998), p125. 
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ones,
14
 and concluded this “suggests that the level of economic development gradually becomes 
less relevant as a factor”.15  
 
Kronthaler & Stephand carried out in-depth research on twelve hypotheses determining a 
country’s decision to enact competition law that can be divided mainly into economic and 
political aspects. From the perspective of factors decreasing (“minus”) or increasing (“plus”) the 
likelihood of a decision to enact competition law they found one factor might be supportive in 
some cases and not in others. A summary of their findings are illustrated below. 
Table 1: Factors affecting the enactment of a competition law 
(-) factors (+) factors 
Increase in the share of state-dominated 
economic activity
16
 
Level of economic development
17
 
Less comprehensive social security 
system
18
 
The size of the economy
19
 
The extent of subsidies and state aid
20
 Stronger reliance on market forces
21
 
The high level of corruption
22
 Increasing openness to trade
23
 
The extent of political intervention in 
foreign trade
24
 
Dependency on FDI
25
 
 Increasing industrialization
26
 
 Membership in RTAs
27
 
The role of the international agencies (via technical assistance and/or financial 
support in the process of legal construction) 
 
Among the above factors, almost all come from the domestic economic, political and social 
contexts and development patterns. Only two other factors, including dependency on FDI and 
                                                 
14
 Kronthaler & Stephan (2007), p140. 
15
 Ibid, p.143.  
16
 Ibid, p.147. 
17
 Ibid, p.143.  
18
 Ibid, p.149. 
19
 Ibid, p.144. 
20
 Ibid, p.149. 
21
 Ibid, p.145. 
22
 Ibid, p.149. 
23
 Ibid, p.146. 
24
 Ibid, p.150. 
25
 Ibid, p.146. 
26
 Ibid, p.147. 
27
 Ibid, p.148. 
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membership in RTAs, can be classified as external driving forces. The last but not least 
important determinant is the significant role of the international agencies like the IMF and the 
UNCTAD. Such organizations showed willingness to help developing and transitional countries 
in various ways. First, support is provided to countries in difficulties on the condition of certain 
requirements (sometimes including the implementation of a competition law). Second, 
assistance is provided to countries that wish to enact a competition law.
28
 It is interesting to find 
that “there are some countries whose competition laws have been introduced at the insistence 
of the IMF”.29 
 
For example, Indonesia is a typical case of external driving forces prevailing in the decision to 
draft the antitrust law. Kovacic (1999) found that “the International Monetary Fund demands a 
transition economy [Indonesia] swiftly adopt a full-blown competition law as a condition of 
receiving emergency financial assistance”.30 
 
A few years later, Raju (2011) ran panel data using economic and political variables to test the 
motivations for enacting a competition law by adding political inputs (namely three variables, 
“the nature of the political system, the rule of law, and the political ideology of the government 
in power”31) at the same time as keeping almost all economic variables on the basis of re-using 
and developing the model applied by Palim (1998) and Kronthaler & Stephan (2007) 
(especially the latter) to cross-check the results gained by the previous researchers. 
 
Besides sharing the viewpoint that “economic factors may provide one set of necessary 
conditions”,32 Raju pointed out that “political characteristics provide an equally important set 
of circumstances that influence the enactment and practice of competition laws”.33 In the 
conclusion of his article, Raju further examines two findings from the results of various 
specifications. Accordingly, democratic and left-leaning governments are more likely to enact 
                                                 
28
 Ibid, p.147. 
29
 David Lewis (2003). The objectives of competition law and policy and the optimal design of a competition 
agency. Cited from Kronthaler & Stephan (2007), p.147. 
30
 William E. Kovacic (1999). Capitalism, socialism, and competition policy in Vietnam. 13 American Bar 
Association Antitrust 57. Summer. p.61. 
31
 Raju Parakkal (2011). Political characteristics and competition law enactment: A cross-country empirical 
analysis. The Antitrust Bulletin: Vol. 56, No. 3/Fall. p626. 
32
 Ibid, p.610. 
33
 Ibid, p.626. 
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competition laws.
34
 Lastly, “the results on the rule of law indicate that many countries with less 
than desirable systems of law have enacted competition laws”35 
 
Natalya Yacheistova (2000) conducted a very comprehensive study of competition policy in 
countries in transition which studied the factors accounting for adopting competition legislation 
in Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). Yacheistova found the following significant 
factors: (i) universal principles of competition regulation used around the world; (ii) 
recommendations of UNCTAD, OECD and other economic organizations; (iii) the task of 
demonopolizing highly concentrated economies after the regime changes in the early 1990s.
36
 
 
Among the US pool of experts studying antitrust relevant topics, William E. Kovacic is 
regarded as the brightest and most experienced (in both theory and practice). Kovacic has 
conducted “ground-breaking work”37 since 1994 to protect the argument that “context matters 
in designing….competition law….for developing countries”.38 During the 1990s, Kovacic 
contributed much to the literature by conducting a number of studies on the pros and cons of 
enacting a competition law and how to design an appropriate one by harmonizing the domestic 
context with universal standards.  
 
Kovacic showed great interest in the countries belonging to the third world and picked some 
countries like Mongolia, Nepal, Zimbabwe, Ukraine and Vietnam for empirical analysis. The 
results of those studies led readers to feel his strong support for enactment of competition laws 
in developing countries where actual needs for competition legislation (domestic/internal needs) 
are intertwined with external pressures. For Kovacic, both internal and external driving forces 
were important and varied due to differences in awareness of competition policy from country 
to country. 
 
Eleanor (2007) further enriched the literature on what affects the enactment of competition 
laws, especially in developing countries. She recommended that formulating their own law is 
appreciated in developing countries as with any nation but that the benefits of following a 
                                                 
34
 Ibid, p.628. 
35
 Ibid, p.628. 
36
 Natalya Yacheistova (2000). Competition policy in countries in transition – legal basis and practical experience. 
UNCTAD/ITCD/CLP/Misc.16. p.46. 
37
 See Eleanor Fox (2007), supra note 2. 
38
 Eleanor Fox (2007).  Economic development, poverty, and antitrust: the other path. Southwestern Journal of Law 
and Trade in the Americas. Vol.13. p102. 
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blazoned path is not a bad idea and that anchoring new laws in existing jurisprudence promises 
greater legal certainty and other efficiencies.
39
 
 
Sengupta and Dube (2008) argue that, “Over the last decade [1998-2008] or so there has been a 
considerable interest in developing countries for adopting competition laws, either at the behest 
of external pressures or as a result of internal developments. It can be inferred from an analysis 
of motivations in most of the cases, adoption of competition policy has been as a result of 
pressure from outside agencies (bilateral, multilateral, advisers, etc.) rather than internal 
policy reforms”.40 Unfortunately, Sengupta and Dupe raise this highly controversial argument 
without showing any evidence or any basis for further reference. Therefore, this is the basis for 
the following study to look more closely at what actually happened in the case of Vietnam and 
to analyze collected information and data to ascertain the impact of internal and external factors, 
as well as their harmonization, on the enactment of Vietnam’s Competition Law. 
 
Furthermore, in most cases in the current literature, researchers have studied competition policy 
in general. As introduced previously, competition policy has a much broader coverage than a 
competition law. As such, there remains a lot of space for studying the enactment of a 
competition bill (especially in developing countries) to posit which factors are important drivers 
of building that law before and during the process. Only a good law (i.e, one that contains 
fundamental regulations on competition related behaviors and provides regulations solving 
competition issues in the actual market situations, etc) can help to tackle competition issues in 
reality and stand well in the face of any internal or external pressure. 
II. The factors determining the enactment of the Vietnam Competition Law (2004) 
 
Without exception, the literature on the enactment of international competition law views the 
passing of the VCL (2004) as a breakthrough marking the economic reform thinking in Vietnam 
(open door to international investment, production and trade) and its strong desire for regional 
and international economic integration. After it was passed, the VCL received a lot of 
compliments from domestic academia, policymakers and public administrators as well as 
international partners and independent experts. 
                                                 
39
 Eleanor Fox (2007).  Economic development, poverty, and antitrust: the other path. Southwestern Journal of Law 
and Trade in the Americas. Vol.13. p121. 
40
 Rijit Sengupta & Cornelius Dube (2008). Competition policy enforcement experiences from developing 
countries and implications for investment. OECD Global Forum on International Investment VII. p4. 
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Surrounding the story of adopting the VCL (2004), a modest number of studies have been 
carried out by both international experts and domestic academia. Kovacic (1999) argued the 
necessity of adopting competition legislation in Vietnam came from the stalled context of the 
Vietnamese economy after a decade of dramatic growth since Doimoi (1986) as well as looking 
at the wave of widespread promulgation of antitrust laws in more than forty nations seeking to 
move from central planning to greater reliance on market processes.
41
 However, Kovacic did 
not go into detail about the reasoning behind the enactment of the VCL, merely emphasizing 
how cautious Vietnam should be (at that time) to look for and follow a suitable approach when 
enacting competition law. 
 
Likewise, Alice Pham (2006) and Tu Thanh Nguyen (2012) reviewed the initial outcomes of 
implementing the VCL and made reference briefly to the development of the VCL. In short, 
both of them attributed the enactment of the VCL to the economic reform movement and to 
international economic integration.  
 
G. Sivalingam (2006) also talked a little about the motivations for adopting the competition law 
in Vietnam. Sivalingam argued that Vietnam was different from Thailand and Indonesia, who 
were under pressure from the IMF, and different again from Singapore, who were highly 
influenced by the signing of an FTA with the United States. Sivalingham argues, “in the case of 
Vietnam it may be both external pressure (the signing of the US-Vietnam BTA) and internal 
pressure to reform that may explain the early introduction of competition law. Furthermore, 
Vietnam had just come out of war and it needed to initiate reforms to attract large inflows of 
FDI.”42  
 
Mark Furse (2010) also falls among the very few researchers writing about the VCL (2004). His 
focus drew attention to the loopholes in the contents and the shortcomings in the enforcement of 
the law by the Competition Administration Agency of Vietnam. His writing spends little time 
on the impetus towards the introduction of the VCL, but argues the prospect of WTO accession 
and the influence of the BTA between Vietnam and the US were the driving factors. Furse also 
                                                 
41
 William E. Kovacic (1999). Capitalism, socialism, and competition policy in Vietnam. 13 American Bar 
Association Antitrust 57. Summer. p57.. 
42
G. Sivalingam (2006). Competition policy and law in ASEAN. 6
th 
Global Conference on Business & Economics, 
Gutman Conference Center, USA.  
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noted the key incentive coming from the liberalization of the economy as demonstrated since 
Doimoi.
43
 
 
The most recent comprehensive and in-depth research on the VCL has been done by Vinh 
Thanh Le in his Ph.D thesis. Vinh (2012) pointed out several interesting and meaningful 
findings related to the promulgation of the VCL (2004). Vinh “explored how Western 
competition law ideas have been interpreted, adapted and implemented in Vietnam”44 and 
concluded that, “imported competition ideas have been interpreted differently by different 
groups of state actors”.45 Vinh’s study therefore provides a logical starting point for this work. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In conclusion, facing such modest literature on the factors affecting the decision to enact a 
competition law around the world with focus on developing countries and even less literature on 
why and how the Vietnam Competition Law was adopted in 2004, there is a paucity of 
information, data and research findings. At the same time, the current VCL has faced a great 
deal of commentary and urgency in proposed revision to the law over the past decade. As such, 
this study identifies how internal and external variables have influenced the enactment of the 
VCL (2004). This provides an interesting case study of why competition law is enacted in 
developing countries and illuminates the dynamic relationship between internal and external 
drivers. Moreover, by understanding how the VCL came into being and what factors shaped its 
contents, scholars and policymakers will be in a stronger position to understand where and how 
revision to the law can be made. 
 
It is commonly and unanimously recognized that economic and political incentives play a 
significant role when determining the decision to construct, implement and approve competition 
legislation. Among those incentives, some come from the national context itself and others take 
root from external pressures and interests. There is little understanding of which factors are 
more or less prevailing. The following chapters show how in the case of Vietnam both internal 
and external factors played a role and perhaps more importantly how these factors were 
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complimentary and harmonized in a way that created a competition law that took effect as a 
legal tool for preserving basic competition principles in the market. The reason for looking at 
inside and outside determinants lies in the fact that the provisions of any law and the 
implementing mechanism are always best reflected in the highest direction of that law. Revision 
to the law cannot simply be removal of problematic articles or input of new articles to meet the 
reality of implementation. By reviewing the factors contributing to the enactment of the VCL, 
including both internal and external factors, a basis is created for conducting a regulatory 
impact assessment or other types of studies that are required prior to amending the law. 
 
The outcomes and findings of previous research, as shown in the above review, are also 
important for identifying the internal and external factors influencing the adoption of VCL 
(2004) and evaluating the harmonization of those two sources of impact. Over the next two 
chapters, the thesis will show how internal and external driving forces have shaped the passing 
of the VCL in December 2004. Chapter two looks separately at both internal and external 
factors. Chapter three brings these factors together and shows how they were harmonized into 
the writing of the competition law. 
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CHAPTER II  
THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL FORCES DRIVING THE ENACTMENT 
OF VIETNAM COMPETITION LAW (2004) 
 
I. The domestic lead-up to the Competition Law Project (1986-2000) 
1.1 Political backdrop 
Party Congressional Resolutions VI, VII, VIII indicating the strategic direction for the 
market economy 
The Communist Party of Vietnam and the Vietnamese Government have institutionalized and 
developed a reformist stance in consecutive Party Congressional Sessions and official 
documents. Building and operating a ‘socialist market-oriented economy’46 has been a broad 
policy goal that has been continuously renewed since the sixth National Party Congress (1986). 
 
At the very first Tenure
47
 of Doimoi (understood as renovation or reform) in 1986, the concept 
of a market economy was not brought in at all. Instead, strong emphasis was put on creating 
‘new mechanisms’ in the economy. “The direction for reforming the economic management 
mechanism could be confirmed as the elimination of centralization, bureaucracy, subsidy and 
establishment of a new mechanism that is in conformity with objective rules and the 
development level of the [national] economy”.48 Nevertheless, this policy goal suggested the 
economy would transition sooner or later as removing centralization, bureaucracy and subsidies 
would help the economy move closer to the goal of freeing up the market.  
 
Following this, Party Congressional Resolution VII (1991) concluded, “The mechanism of 
operating the multi-sectorial commodity economy following socialist orientation is the market 
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mechanism under the monitoring of the State”.49 This was a highly significant conclusion. At 
this early stage, the Party recognized the commodity economy and the market mechanism, but 
only as the operational mechanism of the economy not as the actual development of a market 
economy. As a result of the 7
th
 Tenure, the market was utilized under the scope of a planning 
commodity market economy. This was a significant shift nonetheless as prior to 1986, the 
concept of market had been totally boycotted and was non-existent in any statement or 
document. Recognition of the market, even in a limited form, was a progressive step in the 
reform of Party and State economic thinking. 
 
Up until the 8
th
 Tenure (1996), the Party mentioned the linkage between political and economic 
reforms while stressing that in the course of promoting industrialization, modernization and 
developing the multi sectorial economy, it is necessary to establish and operate the market 
mechanism monitored by the State with socialist orientation at the same time.
50
 The 1996 
Resolution also indicated that market mechanism proved to have a lot of advantages as 
improving socio-economic development in a positive manner, therefore, market mechanism was 
not in contradiction with, but in conformity with the national development with socialist 
orientation.
51
   
 
The strategic direction of the development of the economy became more and more clearly 
expressed and was increasingly accepted and promoted as being attached to the market 
mechanism. The role, necessity and the impact of the market was gradually recognized by the 
Party and the State, reflecting a major “transition” in economic development vision and 
concepts. 
   
In 2001 the Socio-economic Development Strategy for the period 2001-2010 was endorsed by 
the Ninth National Congress of the Communist Party of Vietnam and the National Assembly. 
This important document concluded there is a need to “establish in a synchronized manner and 
continue developing and completing different kinds of market in parallel with the formation of a 
legal and institutional framework for the market to operate dynamically, efficiently, and orderly 
in a competitive, open, and transparent environment in which anti-competitive practices shall 
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be controlled and prevented”.52 This was the first official use of the phrase “socialist-oriented 
market economy” in the Party Congressional Resolution as is widely considered in Vietnam as 
the comprehensive modeling of the national economy on the way toward a socialist society.
53
  
 
In sum, the approach to the market economy by the top leaders of Vietnam has been 
progressively changed and revised to meet the actual situation and domestic needs in the 
economy. Based on the actual changes evident in the practice of operating the economy, from a 
highly centralized planning model to utilizing the market mechanism, Vietnam has witnessed 
major “evolution” in terms of politico-economic thinking. Recognition of the market 
mechanism in multi sectorial economic activities has marked the basic but significant 
foundation for other progress in the course of operating the market economy. 
 
The 1992 Constitution and the amended Constitution of 2001  
Though general as the 1992 Constitution (amended in 2001) might be, it does detail the 
economic system in Chapter II. It states, “The economic sectors constitute important 
components of the socialist-oriented market economy. Individuals and organizations from 
different economic sectors may conduct production and business in industries and trades 
permitted by law; may jointly carry out long term development and cooperation and shall be 
equal and shall compete in accordance with the law” 54 
 
Specification of the economic system in the Constitution was very meaningful as it laid down a 
concrete background for overall economic development from that point on. Official indication 
of the socialist market-oriented economy once again affirmed the consistency of the Party and 
the National Assembly in the direction of economic development. It was also a bold 
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confirmation of equality and competition for the various economic actors, both state and non-
state, across the national economy. 
 
While the Party Congressional Resolution and relevant documents played the role as the 
“lodestar” for implementing Party and State directives and policies, the Constitution also 
legalized and institutionalized general viewpoints on key development areas throughout the 
entire country. Both these official materials granted a very strong backdrop for high level 
political will to start to build a market economy in Vietnam. Although the process of realizing 
political reforms in practice required a long-term struggle with much effort contributed by many 
actors, the political backdrop was comprehensive and appropriate enough in detailing the next 
steps in operating the market economy (following the socialist orientation). 
 
1.2 Economic backdrop 
 
 Doimoi policy as a milestone turning Vietnam to a new model of development 
Before 1986, Vietnam followed the model of a centrally planned economy with robust 
intervention of the “State Hand” in all economic activities. It is not too difficult to imagine how 
underdeveloped and weak the Vietnamese economy was as a legacy of the national struggles in 
the two wars from 1945 to 1975. As a consequence, all the domestic production and business 
activities were conducted in a monopolistic manner where the concept of competition was 
deemed too “luxurious”. 
 
After gaining national independence and unification, the entire economy was facing many 
difficulties and obsolescent modes of production. According to the statistics of the Ministry of 
Industry and Trade, during the period 1975-1985, the country witnessed stagnating import-
export activities and chronic trade deficits. The reasons for this poor economic performance 
were: (i) imports and exports were conducted through the central planning mechanism; (ii) a 
state monopoly was deployed in foreign trade and the target markets were mostly other socialist 
countries. Over the entire country, there was only around 30 state owned companies involved in 
import-export activities, with 70 percent of the total turnover coming from sectors still using 
Rubles.
55
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It was characteristic of Vietnam at that time to run its economy through planning and 
administrative ordinances/orders. Hence, when the economy lagged behind and showed many 
shortcomings, it made the top leaders seek ways out and come up with new ideas, new measures 
and new strategies. Coupled with the economic drawbacks and so-called ‘failure’, the political 
and social models of the time were no longer appropriate. A comprehensive reform program 
was required. 
 
The ‘Doimoi’ policy was brought into life in 1986 as specified precisely in Party Congressional 
Resolution VI. Vietnam started to reform step-by-step in three key ‘battles’ including in 
thinking, economics and politics. Most striking among the comprehensive reforms was the 
economic reform program. This could be summarized in a few words, ‘market oriented, multi-
sector, regional and global integration’. 
 
 Vietnam embarked on Doi Moi policy in 1986 with three main pillars: (i) 
to shift from a centrally planned economy to a market- oriented one; (ii) 
to develop a multi-sector economy in which the private sector plays an 
increasingly important role; and (iii) to actively and effectively integrate 
into regional and global economy in accordance with Vietnam’s 
situation.
56
 
 
Certainly, such big ambitions could not be realized and implemented overnight. Time was the 
best answer to the real efforts of the Vietnamese Government in conducting a comprehensive 
reform program with the core focus on economic reform. Because economic activities are the 
“grass root” of any society’s development, these efforts have had a significant impact on 
Vietnam’s development. 
 
Even though it was not precisely indicated in any official document the reform program implied 
that the “market delivers better outcomes than the state planning; and central to the idea of a 
market is the process of competition”.57 In general, the very basic benefits of competition can 
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be listed as, “lower prices, better products, wide choice and greater efficiency than would be 
obtained under competition of monopoly”.58 
 
Once Vietnam set the goal of building a market-oriented economy through Doimoi, they had no 
way but to “import” competition legislation into the legal system at the appropriate time. But in 
an overall picture, Doimoi laid the very first foundation for coming up with the ideas on and 
developing the Competition Law Project in the following years. Without Doimoi, scholars and 
policymakers would not have been in a position to consider and to import competition policy 
from abroad. 
 
Weakness and low efficiency of the economy as a strong incentive for building a legal 
framework on competition 
Before Doimoi, the national economy was in stagnation due to many reasons, including the 
poor performance of State-Owned Enterprises (SOE). Almost the entire economy had been 
made up of this single type of economic activity. For such a long time, operation of SOEs 
followed a familiar pattern: SOEs run their business; if they made a loss the State would make 
up for that loss; if they made a profit the State would take the profit. Under these circumstances, 
economic efficiency was low and State intervention was responsible for the failure or success of 
business activities in all sectors across the economy. 
The national economy [was] regulated by the State mainly through the legal 
system, macro-economic tools and rarely through administrative measures 
which are not based on economic efficiency.
59
 
Tu (2001) describes how the Government managed the activities of enterprises via the 
mechanism of ‘ask and permit’ (cơ chế xin cho). This was a national problem as it distorted 
natural competition among enterprises especially among public and private ones. It also led to 
members of those SOEs having no motivation and passion for work and dedication. They had 
no incentive to up-skill, improve their education or training, or to be critical and creative in their 
daily work. Too much intervention by the State in all economic activities had led to weakness 
and very low efficiency in the economy and especially in the economic activities of SOEs. 
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According to Trinh Anh Tuan (2013), before the VCL (2004) came into force, there was 
legislation such as the Ordinance on Price, the Ordinance on Telecommunications, the Law on 
Credit Institutions, Commercial Law, Electricity Law, etc that provided regulations to support 
anticompetitive practices. However, implementation of this type of legislation was not really 
effective, partly due to a lack of a complete and consistent legal framework, lack of state 
management competency on competition and monopoly control, and lack of sanctions.
60
 
 
For a long time (even since 1994 when the Prime Minister issued Decision No.90/TTg on the 
continuous arrangement of State Corporations),
61
 State Corporations have held the role of 
national champions in international competition resulting in their broad coverage restricting 
competition between enterprises in public and private sectors.
62
 
 
In a nutshell, because competition has not been favored or facilitated in business activities of 
enterprises in the market, the economy has naturally functioned with low efficiency and 
contained a great many weaknesses. Competition itself is not a multifunctional key to this large 
“problem” but it has become a bridge to connect all sectors of the economy via the instrument 
of competition law as a legal framework to force those sectors to work under the mechanism of 
competition. In fact, competition law works best when in parallel with a package of regulatory 
laws. Regulatory laws on their own are not adequate for the purpose of maintaining competition 
in the market and creating competitiveness in the economy. 
 
Right from the beginning of the Doimoi era, the State paid more attention to the macro concept 
of competitiveness of the nation or the economy because at that time they did not understand 
well the nature of competition of business activities. From then on ‘competition’ (in Vietnamese 
“cạnh tranh”) became something negative as people began to understand it as a “fight against 
each other”. People looked mostly at the bad side of the word without anticipating that 
competition would become the impetus for economic growth and a key element of the market-
oriented economy. It took time to increase the Government’s awareness of the role of 
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competition in the linkage to economic development, trade liberalization and the goal of 
building a market economy. 
 
The table below provides more insight into the economic freedom of Vietnam in the period 
1995-2003. The overall score indicates the economic freedom index of an economy. The 
numbers represent the following: free is classified as a score of 10.99 or less; mostly free is a 
score of 20.0 to 20.99; mostly unfree is a score of 30.0 to 30.99; and, repressed is a score of 40 
or higher. In terms of Vietnam’s record, for most of the period from 1995 to 2003 Vietnam’s 
economy has been repressed with low levels of business freedom and trade freedom. This once 
again reinforced for policymakers of the time that Vietnam needed a competition legal 
framework in the immediate term and a comprehensive competition policy in the long run to 
support the effective operation of the market and the economy. 
 
Table 2: The Economic Freedom Index
63
 of Vietnam in selected year 
 
 Rule of law Limited Government Regulatory efficiency Open market 
Index 
year 
Overall 
score 
Property 
rights 
Freedom 
from 
corruption 
Fiscal 
freedom 
Govt. 
spending 
Business 
freedom 
Labor 
freedom 
Monetary 
freedom 
Trade 
freedom 
Investment 
freedom 
Financial 
freedom 
1995 41.7 10 10 68.8 87.1 40 N/A 55.2 44.6 30 30 
1996 40.2 10 10 54.8 79.1 40 N/A 63.3 44.6 30 30 
1997 38.6 10 10 42.8 78.9 40 N/A 61.0 44.6 30 30 
1998 40.4 10 10 43.4 83 40 N/A 66.2 51 30 30 
1999 42.7 10 28 43 81.4 40 N/A 70.8 51 30 30 
2000 43.7 10 25 53.9 84.1 40 N/A 69.3 51 30 30 
2001 44.3 10 26 54.1 86.8 40 N/A 71.1 51 30 30 
2002 45.6 10 25 54.1 90.3 40 N/A 80.4 51 30 30 
2003 46.2 10 26 62.5 83 40 N/A 86.5 47.6 30 30 
 Source: Heritage Foundation  
 
Increasing awareness of competition in the interactive relationship with economic 
growth, construction of the market economy and trade liberalization 
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Correlation between competition and economic growth 
Though Doimoi was ground-breaking in the development of Vietnam, it took many years until 
after 1991, the year of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the leader of communist countries, for 
people in Vietnam to come round to its significance and “wake up” to its real meaning. 
 
There are many explanations for why it took time for Doimoi, and support for competition in 
particular, to be appreciated. One explanation from Alexander Vuving (2005) is that the foreign 
policy of Vietnam in the post Cold War years, included two grand strategies with differing 
elements: 
 
Table 3: The two Grand Strategies of Vietnam Foreign Policy after the Cold War 
 
Source: Alexander Vuving (2005). The shaping of Foreign Policy Vietnamese Grand Strategy 
after the Cold War.
64
 
 
As can be seen in the table above, the two elements of Vietnamese foreign policy and the 
worldview inherent in each have very different elements. In the post Cold War years it has 
taken some time for Doimoi to create an environment where ideas and policies such as 
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competition are promoted. This required a shift in grand strategy and focus from anti-
imperialism to modernization to allow competition to emerge as a key political idea. 
 
As indicated in a study conducted by the Office of Fair Trading of the UK, competition is “a 
key factor in driving growth”. Firstly, competition creates a “within-firm” effect when placing 
pressure on the managers of firms to become more efficient.
65
 Secondly, competition causes an 
“across-firm” effect as the higher productivity firms can increase their market share at the 
expense of the less productive thanks to competition.
66
 In other words, market entry and exit of 
firms becomes a cycle. Entry of one firm is paid by the exit of another firm under the pressure 
of competition. Thirdly, competition drives firms to innovate.
67
 Competition among firms 
boosts innovation and is an engine for growth and productivity. This might be the most 
important characteristic of competition from the perspective of economic growth. It is therefore 
understandable that the absence of competition, subsidy and protectionism would push the 
economic activities in a “silent mode” because firms would find no need to come up with new 
ideas about product quality or diversity. They would still be “safe” if they make a loss. In this 
case, the Government is always there to give a hand and intervene when necessary to save its 
firms. Without innovation geared by competition, all production activities would stand still, 
which would lead to a stagnant economy. 
 
The new focus on modernization in the post Cold War years created the environment for these 
ideas to take hold. However, it is not easy for policy makers and practitioners of any economy 
to remove subsidies for economic activities entirely. In practice, there is no perfect competition 
in any economy. Vietnamese policymakers therefore welcomed competition in almost all 
sectors but in the case of certain essential industries, the Government would not be an outsider. 
Overall however, policymakers came to view competition as a central element of the 
transitional economy and a prerequisite condition/evidence of a market oriented economy. This 
shift is evident in the economic development in Vietnam in the period after Doimoi in 1986. 
 
Interaction between competition and trade liberalization 
Competition policy and regulation are a concrete basis for creating a fair and healthy domestic 
market for the following reasons: Firstly, trade liberalization promotes competition from 
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foreign commodities and services and at the same time, domestic ones face less and less 
subsidies from the Government (because of privileged policies, tariff policies, etc applied for 
foreign enterprises). Subsidies are the root of anti-competitive behavior whether purposely or 
accidentally such as through business agreements, abuse of dominant position/monopoly on the 
market that causes damage to a fair competition environment among businesses. Those anti-
competitive acts will increase the risks to the establishment of a free market. Therefore, 
anticipated benefits from trade liberalization might be invalid if competition law and policy 
cannot cover well the whole economy or encounter limited effectiveness in enforcement. On the 
other hand, with the role as the mechanism to establish and protect competition, competition 
policy helps promote market relations in economic life, forming market self-regulating 
mechanisms, etc. In other words, competition policy should be considered as a “tool” in 
protection of trade liberalization. 
 
Secondly, liberal trade policy and competition policy are not “strange bedfellows”; they are 
actually “best friends”. A complete system consists of legislation, regulation and 
implementation commitments towards international agreements in the process of opening a 
market under a national roadmap. At this point, liberal trade policy provides a basis for 
establishing a healthy competition environment and competition policy helps maintain the 
fairness of that environment as well as bringing efficiency for economies involved in the 
process of trade liberalization. 
 
Competition - a key element of a market economy 
In the Report on Competition (circulated for internal use in the Vietnamese Ministry of Trade, 
2000), the research team (on the purpose of conducting pre-conditional studies for the 
Competition Law Project) suggested significant findings related to competition and building a 
market economy. The followings conclusions in the report show how domestic policymakers 
had converged on the ideas and arguments related to competition policy as explored above. 
 
First, the report argued that competition is an inevitable output of the market economy and an 
impetus for economic development. Second, that competition is a significant factor stimulating 
application of science and technology in production activities. In cases where supply is higher 
than demand competition among sellers means the one coming up with innovation or better 
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management/processes that can sell a more quality product at a more competitive price will 
likely prevail. 
 
Third, the report noted that when supply is lower than demand, markets for the product would 
become scarce; market price will be pushed higher than average profit. This motivates 
producers to invest in more production or improve the productivity of the available production 
bases. This motivation is very meaningful for the development of the entire market and more 
importantly, it does not come from any administrative order of the Government. 
 
Lastly, the report concluded that due to the pressure and impact of competition, there would be 
winners and losers in the market but that failing firms are not negative for social welfare as the 
resources of society move from one producer to another producer who has better and more 
effective performance. Bankruptcy was not conceptualized as predation or destruction but 
understood as the removal of a competitor for creativity, and the notion that only efficient 
companies can survive. This was seen as beneficial for not only technology innovation but also 
for social welfare. 
 
These findings are extracted from the internal report. It shows the progressive thinking of the 
supporting team for the drafting of the VCL and is evident of a major strategic shift in the 
intellectual thinking of the Vietnamese Government. As argued by Kovacic (1999), at the turn 
of the century, intellectual foundations and social consensus play very important roles in the 
enactment of a competition law. “In transition economies, the requisite foundation and social 
consensus do not emerge spontaneously…The beginnings of the intellectual and social 
foundations for competition policy are emerging in Vietnam.”68 This shows the importance of 
domestic drivers of the introduction of competition policy in Vietnam. 
 
 Enactment of Competition Law – a reflection of domestic needs for economic 
development 
As a way of bringing Doimoi into real life, the Government started implementing policies on 
eliminating state budget subsidies (bao cấp). At the same time, competition among businesses 
emerged and appeared to be increasingly severe, which led the Government to come up with 
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remedy measures to “fix” shortcomings in the market. As part of this aim a series of research 
studies on the competition environment in Vietnam were conducted. The first was from the 
Research Institute on Market and Pricing Science in 1996, followed by the Central Institute for 
Economic Management in 2000 and 2002 and the Institute of State and Law in 2001.
69
 
 
From these studies and internal discussion three key factors emerged
70
 and shaped the drafting 
of the Law: 
 
1. The need for regulating the market economy via a legal system in which Competition Law is 
a fundamental law 
 
Policymakers agreed there is no competition in a centrally planned economy but competition is 
the key role in operating a market economy. In other words they decided that for Vietnam to be 
recognized as a market economy, competition must be prioritized as a major feature. 
 
Totally different from state intervention in business activities before 1986, the 1992 
Constitution (which was again amended in 2001) stipulated the multi-sectorial structure of the 
economy and the desirability of economic sectors competing.
71
 This meant that businesses 
irrespective of ownership model could compete on the market instead of being regulated and 
intervened by the State as previously. 
 
From this time on, a number of basic laws, such as the Foreign Investment Law (1996), Trade 
Law (1997) and the Enterprise Law (1999), came into effect to create a proper legal corridor for 
businesses to “enjoy” competition. 
 
2. The need for controlling monopolies in the context of opening the market for the purpose of 
international economic integration 
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Policymakers further decided that irrespective of how they are formed or exist, a monopoly 
creates negative effects in the domestic economy. Monopolies lead to predatory pricing and 
badly impact consumer welfare. Policymakers decided it would be too ambitious for Vietnam to 
be expected to let the market operate with no government intervention (i.e., if there was pure 
competition in all sectors) at that time, so instead, the Government also envisioned that some 
monopolies would remain and that it would take time to build up a level playing field for all 
sectors. 
 
As such, these policymakers decided that because anticompetitive and unfair competition acts 
tended to increase under market conditions and these impacted the initial “positive” effects of 
competition among businesses, therefore, an umbrella law like a competition law was a good 
choice and an appropriate instrument for the Government to regulate competition issues in all 
sectors. Competition law and its sub-law regulations would be a mechanism for maintaining and 
ruling competition for all players. 
 
Between the late 1990s and early 2000s, joining bilateral and regional free trade agreements 
became a tendency in economic life globally. Multinational companies increasingly went 
abroad to look for promising land in developing countries, including Vietnam. In addition, 
thanks to privilege and favorable conditions to attract foreign investment widely encouraged by 
the Government, multinational companies were potential competitors to domestic producers and 
suppliers. Their “globalized vision” posed big threats to domestic enterprises that were 
disadvantaged in terms of technology, capital and skilled human resources. 
 
The early Vietnamese economy during the initial stage of a long transition availed many 
opportunities accompanied by threats. Policymakers therefore decided that without a proper 
legal tool like competition legislation, domestic players stood the risk of losing on their home 
field. 
 
3. The need for a fair competition environment for the business community 
Finally, policymakers recognized the need for a fair competition environment. Even though the 
1992 Constitution had stated multi economic sectors existed, were to be equal and should 
compete, discrimination in treating businesses in different sectors (especially between the 
private and public sectors) remained a popular challenge. 
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For example, the Report presented by Minister Tuyen at the Government meeting dated 28-29 
January 2004, noted some anonymous examples of anticompetitive behavior. There was 
direction in X province where it was compulsory to buy cement from local cement companies 
to use for local construction works. In Y province, the Department of Education ordered schools 
in their locality to buy ball point pens from local companies. 
 
Such examples were clearly “surrogating” competition and “obvious interference” in the 
market. Therefore, a major domestic driver of the competition policy was the realization that 
there were many examples of anticompetitive policies in which production was not promoted 
and consumption was not fostered. 
 
In summary, this section has shown that there were many domestic drivers of the introduction 
of competition policy in Vietnam. These include the low effective performance of the economy 
(due to dominant position of SOEs and too much intervention of the State); the awareness of the 
concurrent Party and State leaders on the role of competition in the market-oriented economy 
and the immediate necessity of issuing a legal document on competition to preserve a fair and 
healthy competition environment for business activities on the market; the readiness and desire 
for international economic integration. Those factors are interactive and complimentary to each 
other. 
 
However, the question is whether internal drivers were influential enough to make policy 
makers come up with the VCL (2004). Actually, if turning back to the history of Vietnamese 
foreign policy, especially the economic foreign relations during 1990s, there were a series of 
striking events showcasing the desire of Vietnam to join the international community. This 
reveals more or less the pressure from outsiders whether in a direct or indirect way. The next 
section will therefore look at the external factors affecting the decision to endorse the VCL 
(2004). 
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II. External driving forces on the Competition Law Project 
 
This section shifts from exploring the domestic drivers of competition policy in Vietnam to the 
external influences. The section argues that external driving forces had their own weight and 
impact in triggering the draft and issuance of the VCL (2004). But different from the internal 
factors which were indicated both directly and indirectly in official documents or statements, 
the external ones were mostly implied from or evidenced by certain movements of the 
Government or the political events prior the Competition Law Project commencement. Among 
external drivers, they can be also categorized into (i) regional or global trends/tendency that 
drove Vietnam to go on the same track (i.e, to some extent, Vietnam had no way but to follow 
the general standard of development); (ii) specific political events that created pressure on 
Vietnam to build up a competition legislation as an important part of the legal system 
stipulating the activities of various business activities on the market. 
2.1 Background of the evolution of Competition Law in the world with particular reference to 
ASEAN 
“It may be the case an approach centered on national antitrust will have a 
substantial payoff for developing countries in helping them to deal with 
international “antitrust spillovers”.72 
Table 4: Expansion of Comprehensive Competition Law in East Asia 
 
Establishment Year Economy Competition Agency 
1947 Japan JFTC 
1980 Korea KFTC 
1991 Chinese Taipei CFTC 
1993 Mongolia AFCCP 
1999 Thailand OTCC 
1999 Indonesia KPPU 
2004 Vietnam VCAD 
2004 Singapore CCS 
2007 China MOFCOM, NDRC, SAIC 
  
Source: Kazuhiko TAKESHIMA (Chairman, Japan Fair Trade Commission), Importance of 
Competition Law & Policy- Japan’s Experience from over 60 years’ Development of the 
Antimonopoly Act, 5
th
 East Asia Conference on Competition Law and Policy  at the 5
th
 East 
Asia Conference on Competition Law and Policy on June 29, 2009 in Ulaanbaatar. 
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If we look closer at the proliferation of competition laws in the ASEAN region, Vietnam is one 
of the early movers and pioneering country in ASEAN. Over a 60-year period, only 9 
economies have introduced and implemented competition law. With the exception of Japan, that 
has a long history of competition enforcement, other economies have only begun to introduce 
competition policy over the last few decades ago. It is noteworthy that competition policy is 
spreading in ASEAN and important to explain why Vietnam was one of the early movers. 
Table 5: Competition Law Implementation in ASEAN 
 
Source: Cassey LEE, Yoshifumi FUKUNAGA (2013). ASEAN Regional Cooperation  
on Competition Policy. ERIA discussion paper series. p7. 
 
Dr. Nguyen Minh Chi, Director General of the Legal Department, Ministry of Trade (current 
Ministry of Industry and Trade) argued in a speech in Phan Thiet, October 23-24, 2000 that 
introduced the Competition Law Project, that there are two approaches when building 
competition law: 
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 The first approach is of Western Europe and North American countries with long-developed 
market economies. This is a long-term development from low levels of development to 
high, from state-governed competition to free market competition and the development of a 
legal system in Western Europe and North America countries. It these economies 
competition has been regulated by different and separatist legal documents. In the early 
period of the market economy, unfair competition practices such as misleading 
advertisement, business privacy violations, and so on began to be codified in unfair trade 
practice acts. Regulations to restrict business practices in high-level developed market 
economies emerged, and included restrictive agreements, abuse of dominant position, 
merger and acquisition. These were codified by another act – the competition act, antitrust 
act or antimonopoly act. 
 
 The second approach is of Eastern Europe and Asian countries, developing market 
economies or economies in transition. When these countries started developing a market 
economy or changing their economy to market orientation, Western Europe and Northern 
America economies were already highly developed. Therefore, in order to meet the 
requirement to develop economically as well as catch up with the globalization trend, 
Eastern European and Asian countries promulgated competition acts covering both unfair 
competition practices and restrictive business practices. 
 
This simple distinction shows the relationship between the level of development in a country 
and the process of international economic integration. 
 
Vietnam is a transitional economy so it now faces the same problems as other transitional 
economies. In many developed countries, competition acts were enacted only after dozens or 
even hundreds of years of developing the market economy. However, Vietnam has only been 
developing a market economy for a short period of time, and therefore the forms and degree of 
expression of competition rules in fields of trade and services has been very short. The previous 
section showed how the implementation of market-oriented reforms has created the requirement 
and desire to implement competition policy. A second track pushing competition policy forward 
in Vietnam has been the context of regionalization and globalization and the models, standards 
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and pressures for competition policy from external actors, particularly those in the advanced 
economies. 
 
2.2 Regionalism and its implications for Vietnam’s international integration process 
 
Throughout the history of development and cooperation among countries in the world, a lot of 
theory has been built up to explain the “spider net” relationship among nation-states. These 
theories focus on the bilateral, regional and multilateral channels that foster cooperation but 
more importantly on whether such channels and agreements can solve common obstacles to 
mutual security, prosperity and so on. 
 
Some argue the world is divided into different regions categorized by political and geographical 
features and that countries in one region tend to “lean on” each other to cope with similar 
challenges. While there is much disagreement on a detailed definition of regionalism there is 
general agreement on a simpler definition: 
 
Regionalism in International Politics and Economy (IPE) is defined as the 
condition by which group of nation-states, usually in the same geographical 
region, agree to cooperate and share responsibility to achieve common goals.
73
 
 
Since Haas raised the concept of regionalism (so called Euro-centric regionalism), there has 
been a lot of debate over the conceptual definitions of “region, regionalism and 
regionalization”. According to Haas (1958), “regional cooperation is a vague term covering 
any interstate activity with less than universal participation designed to meet commonly 
experienced need”.74 During the 1950s-1960s, other neofunctionalists approached regional 
cooperation in this way and “focused mainly on political spillovers to create chains of events 
whereby regional integration, once started, became a self-powered mechanism”.75 Haas and his 
contemporary researchers touched upon regionalism as the answer to the phenomenon of 
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regionalizing Europe and left out analysis of other regions in the rest of the world. This kind of 
approach is now considered as the old wave or first generation of regionalism. 
 
The widespread establishment of sub-regional and regional organizations in other corners of the 
continent paved the way for academia to turn back to regionalism theory later. This is regarded 
as the new wave or second generation of regionalism.  
 
“The new regionalism took shape in a multipolar world order and in a context of 
globalization”.76 This means that in the integration process, core players are not just states any 
more as non-state actors are also getting involved in this process due to the wave of 
globalization. Over the past few decades, in economic area, while countries join multilateral 
trade systems like the WTO, sub-regional or regional organizations still play an important role 
calling their members to make agreements and implement cooperation mechanisms for regional 
development.  
 
Though the “super spaghetti bowl” might be used to describe the “overlapping” situation of 
countries participating in different world and regional organizations/forums, countries appear to 
be satisfied with this complicated interaction. States can look for and touch upon specific goals 
from each relationship. Scholars such as Richard Baldwin argue this process can create a 
“domino effect” whereby regional agreements lead to a propensity to create more regional 
agreements with more members.  
 
There are some concerns over the emerging establishment of regional organizations and about 
the possibility of extensive management of a lot of relationships at the same time. However, 
looking at this phenomenon as a prevailing trend in economic life at the global level, it is 
apparent that increasingly intensive interdependence among countries, especially countries with 
the same geographical proximity, push them to move closer together through economic 
agreements and to promote their common prosperity. 
 
To put it simply, at school you have choices over a wide range of clubs to make friends with 
whom of similar hobbies and you might join a number of clubs to satisfy (i) your need for 
harmony with other friends; (ii) your expectation yourself; (iii) your desire to keep up with 
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contemporary trends, etc. Obviously, the student union is big and has wide coverage, it is still 
not enough for you and clubs offer more chances to get engaged and prove your strength. 
 
Countries in the same geographic area establish a regional organization with a view to 
maximize their advantages and not to be on the sideline of the playing field. As a matter of fact, 
any player could foresee a “dark” scenario when there is big gap between domestic and regional 
development and they have to follow the rules of “give and take”, but most countries have 
concluded that being regionally integrated brings more good than harm. 
 
To distinguish from regionalization, which “refers to the more complex processes of forming 
regions”,77 Björn Hettne (2005) suggested that “regionalism refers to a tendency and a political 
commitment to organise the world in terms of regions”.78 Whether being in favor of 
regionalism or not, countries must admit that it has expanded like wildfire and become an 
integral part of the economic life of countries, trading companies and transnational 
corporations. 
 
The assessment above shows why the Vietnamese Government has pursued regionalism and 
wants to be friends with other countries in the regional and international community. Vietnam 
has found it necessary to enter into regional or world organizations (whether economic or 
political ones) to be part of the common wave and tendency of development and interaction. If 
in the past, Vietnam turned its back to Western countries and received “suspicious eyes” from 
most ASEAN member countries, since affirming its good will in international integration, 
Vietnam has moved toward regionalism in line with what has bloomed in ASEAN since the 
1990s. The norms and values of competition policy have been nurtured in this process. Below 
are the stories of Vietnam-ASEAN, Vietnam-APEC, Vietnam-WTO and Vietnam-US written in 
1995, 1998, 1995 (till 2007) and 2001 respectively to show how interaction with other 
countries, combined with domestic reforms, pushed forward the development of competition 
policy in Vietnam. 
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2.3 ASEAN membership of Vietnam  
 
ASEAN was established in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. 
Nearly 20 years later, Brunei joined the Association in 1984. Vietnam became a member in 
1995 followed by Laos and Myanmar in 1997 and then Cambodia in 1999 making up the 
ASEAN 10.
79
 
 
The ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) came into force on 1 January 1993.
80
 Accordingly, after 
becoming the official member of ASEAN, Vietnam was under the commitment and obligation 
to impose average tariff on imports originating from ASEAN countries from 5 to 20% in the 
period of 2003 and 2006.
81
 This commitment expressed the requirement for opening and 
restructuring the market and the country’s desire for international market integration. Of course, 
there were a lot of challenges and opportunities arising from being an ASEAN member and 
especially obligations under the framework of the AFTA. In the case of AFTA, Vietnamese 
companies had to compete with companies from other ASEAN countries. Under these 
circumstances, if the State did not construct a legal framework to regulate competition in the 
domestic market (in order to increase productivity and efficiency of domestic production 
activities), national companies would be in a poor position to survive competition with regional 
competitors. 
 
At the 9th ASEAN Summit in 2003, the ASEAN Leaders resolved that an ASEAN Community 
should be established. The resulting ASEAN Community is often known as consisting of 3 
pillars: 1) the ASEAN Political-Security Community, 2) the ASEAN Economic Community 
and 3) the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community.
82
 
 
Moreover, the ASEAN Economic Community Blueprint (AEC, 2008) envisaged “a highly 
competitive economic region”83 as one of the four key characteristics and ASEAN specified 
action in the field of competition policy> Chief among these actions was to “Endeavour to 
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introduce competition policy in all ASEAN Member Countries by 2015”.84 This meant that 
there was no direct pressure from ASEAN members to pass a competition bill early. Vietnam 
fell among one of the few countries in the region that promulgated a Competition Law in the 
early part of the century. 
 
“ASEAN cooperation (through the implementation of AFTA, ATA, AFAS, infrastructure 
linkage, development of human resources, etc.) can play an essential role in promoting resource 
allocation efficiency and economic growth in Vietnam”.85 Joining ASEAN revealed to the 
Vietnamese Government that regional integration was a momentum for Vietnam to find ways to 
increase the efficiency of the economy. Through this process, competition in the market became 
a “core” issue. Competition policy was seen as essential for contributing to competitiveness of 
business operating in the regional market and ultimately a way of promoting the 
competitiveness of the whole economy in the entire region. 
 
2.4 APEC membership of Vietnam and the Competition Policy and Law Group 
In the context of the emergence of regional economic blocs in the world and the increasing 
interdependence of Asia-Pacific economies,
86
 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) was 
born in 1989. This organization acts as an open forum for countries in the Pacific Rim to get 
together and aim at the ultimate goal of boosting economic growth, cooperation, trade and 
investment in the Asia-Pacific region.
87
  
Vietnam gained official membership in 1998 (only 3 years after entering ASEAN) marking a 
milestone in the process of implementing the foreign policy of openness, multilateralization, 
diversification and international economic integration.
88
 Through this process Vietnamese 
policymakers came in contact with groups formulating competition policy in the Pacific Rim. 
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The CPLG (Competition Policy and Law Group), formerly known as the Competition Policy 
and Deregulation Group (CPDG), was established in 1996, when the Osaka Action Agenda 
(OAA) work programmes on competition policy and deregulation were combined. In 1999, 
APEC Ministers endorsed the APEC Principles to Enhance Competition and Regulatory 
Reform and approved a "roadmap" which established the basis for subsequent work on 
strengthening markets in the region.
89
 Their preamble recognized “the strategic importance of 
developing competition principles to support the strengthening of markets to ensure and sustain 
growth in the region and that these principles provide a framework that links all aspects of 
economic policy that affect the functioning of markets”.90 Actually, the CPLG was among the 
very first group dealing with competition issues in Asia. 
At the time of Vietnam joining APEC, the CPDG came into force for two years and made a lot 
of effort to advocate the introduction of competition law in the economies who did not yet have 
it. The rationale for building competition legislation and implementing competition policy was 
attached to the correlation between competition and deregulation. This conformed to the status 
quo of the Vietnamese economy during the period of the 1990s when the open market policy 
made initial achievements (e.g., dramatic growth of the entire economy). However, state 
intervention actually increased after a decade of Doimoi requiring more robust deregulation in a 
number of sectors. 
It is not possible to attribute the application of competition policy to the participation of 
Vietnam in several regional and international organizations as prevailing external factors 
towards the enactment of the Vietnam Competition Law. To some extent however, without any 
binding commitment or direct pressure from the membership of those organizations, including 
APEC, Vietnam came to realize the necessity and the importance of establishing competition 
policy in the long run and adopting a competition law in the short run to meet with the 
development standard of the region as well as the world. These organizations helped facilitate 
knowledge transfer and normative diffusion that supported the domestic changes within 
Vietnam. In this way, implications for enacting a competition law as a legal corridor for 
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preserving competition in regulatory sectors was gradually absorbed by policy and lawmakers 
in Vietnam during that period. 
APEC is characterized by a loose commitment mechanism. APEC tends to provide guideline 
and encouragement for member economies in integration with other members. Vietnam did not 
have a competition law until 2004 and even then there were only seven officials working for the 
competition board under the Ministry of Trade (currently the Ministry of Industry and Trade). 
Therefore, from 1999 to 2004, the Department of Multilateral Trade Policy, MOT was 
responsible for external economic relations with partners in terms of competition. During that 
period, Vietnam had the chance to join a series of programs and meetings under the framework 
of CPDG (then CPLG). Participation in such APEC activities exerted influence on the process 
of coming out with basic ideas about competition in Vietnam. While no partner in APEC 
explicitly told Vietnam that they must implement certain competition policy or law, the working 
agenda and the cooperation framework under this forum provided a forum for sharing ideas thus 
stimulating Vietnam’s thinking on these issues. 
The Osaka Action Agenda was upgraded in 2002. Part One, Section C, 8 specifies the key 
objectives and guidelines of competition policy in APEC economies: 
OBJECTIVE: APEC economies will enhance the competitive environment to 
increase consumer welfare in the Asia-Pacific region, by (c.) improving the 
ability of competition authorities, though enhanced capacity building and 
technical assistance, to better understand the impact of globalization and the 
New Economy. 
GUIDELINES: Each APEC economy will: (b.) enforce competition policies 
and/or laws … to ensure protection of the competitive process and promotion of 
consumer welfare, innovation, economic efficiency and open markets; (c.) 
disclose any pro-competitive efforts undertaken; (d) implement as appropriate 
technical assistance in regard to policy development, legislative drafting, and the 
constitution, powers and functions of appropriate enforcement agencies; and (f) 
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undertake additional steps as appropriate to support the development of the New 
Economy and to ensure the efficient functioning of markets.
91
 
This guideline was very general and held no binding principles forcing the member economies 
to enforce competition policy and/or law. This is understandable as the nature of APEC builds 
on discussion and communication about various aspects of economic cooperation without any 
obligations or commitments. Different from the way other international financial organizations, 
such as the IMF or World Bank (who sometimes set competition enforcement as the requisite 
condition for other assistance), APEC was much softer focusing on advocating competition law 
and policy and promoting the awareness of governments without a competition regime. Instead 
of sticking to the top-down approach, the bottom-up approach seems to be more favored by 
APEC. 
2.5 Vietnam’s application for WTO 
 
The second major external driver of competition policy and law in Vietnam was Vietnam’s 
accession to the WTO. The WTO was established in 1995
92
 with the ultimate purpose and 
mission being to liberalize world trade. This is achieved through WTO agreements that have 
been signed by the bulk of the world’s trading nations. “These documents provide the legal 
ground rules for international commerce. They are essentially contracts, binding governments 
to keep their trade policies within agreed limits.”93  
 
Competition policy is a legal tool attached to the overall process of international economic 
integration and should therefore be seen as part of this broader endeavor to lessen international 
trade barriers and liberalize world trade. While trade policy tends to protect a domestic 
economy (via trade remedy measures like antidumping or anti-subsidy), competition policy in 
international trade negotiations is an instrument to minimize the negative impact of domestic 
policies that might badly affect foreign enterprises’ production and transaction activities. Used 
in parallel with trade policy, competition policy can handle issues arising from competition 
among market players. 
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In fact, there exist no precise provisions under the framework of WTO on national competition 
law as a binding commitment or considering competition as a compulsory proponent in trade 
liberalization. “WTO Members are free to adopt any competition law they wish – the only 
constraint that is potentially imposed is nondiscrimination (national treatment (Art.III)”.94 
Nevertheless, in order to meet the general requirements of any applicant for WTO membership, 
there are always clear implications for and great importance attached to building and enforcing 
competition.  
 
Competition policy goes well beyond the WTO framework. This can be explained by the fact 
that national competition law differs from member to member countries so it is challenging to 
reach a standard or harmonize global competition law. While a great number of WTO members, 
mostly developing countries, have competition policy there are serious issues with effective 
enforcement. They have the challenge of attempting to implement effective competition policy 
as in developed and experienced countries. Furthermore, there are many different viewpoints on 
competition related issues like monopoly, government subsidy, and national protection of 
domestic industries. Once viewpoints and stances are competing, reaching agreement on this 
issue among WTO member states has proved impossible in reality. 
 
Developing countries are well aware that competition policy is necessary in the context of 
increasing economic patterns that span national boundaries and that require a healthy and fair 
competition environment. Generally, however, they take into account the whole picture of the 
economy and promote the gradual establishment of competition policy in regulatory sectors or 
preparation of a comprehensive and general competition law. Because such countries are 
lagging in economic development they face unavoidable difficulties and obstacles building up 
competition legislation and policy. 
 
At the same time, developed countries still tend to keep using competition policy as an 
instrument in certain sectors but are not likely to use it as a macro policy tool as they are more 
attracted by and interested in industrial development policy rather than in-depth cooperation in 
the field of competition.  
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In general, developed countries often require developing ones to open their market more and 
more via a consistent stance on creating a fair competition environment for businesses of all 
types. To some extent, preserving a fair competition environment for domestic and foreign 
funded companies is also considered a supporting tool for trade liberalization and investment –
the core working principles of the WTO. In the course of economic integration, any country 
without effective regulation of competition among domestic companies and multinational 
companies would be economically vulnerable and not be able to take advantage of the 
opportunities offered by trade liberalization.
95
 
 
Vietnam applied for the official membership of the WTO in 1995 in the context of promoting 
the process of international economic integration and needed 11 years to conclude required 
negotiations and finish the necessary procedures for membership. Here, there is a clear line 
between the internal and external driving forces towards the adoption of the VCL (2004). The 
desire to open to international economic processes came from within Vietnam and the 
application for WTO membership was also a domestic need. However, in the course of the very 
complicated and hard negotiations with the WTO at both the bilateral and multilateral levels, I 
would like to argue that there was indirect pressure on the issuance of a competition law as one 
condition for WTO entry. However, this pressure was not really strong and had direct influence 
on the determination to draft and adopt that law. 
 
There was a huge workload dealing with a great deal of questions and concerns related to 
technical negotiations with other partners and in explanations prepared by Vietnam. The basic 
contents were related to tariffs imposed on imports and exports; market access; trade 
liberalization; investment; and, intellectual property. Policy transparency was also a pre-
requisite condition for opening negotiations for opening the market.
96
 
 
If we look at differences between the Vietnam-US Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) and WTO 
accession requirements,
97
 a lot of complicated technical requirements were posed during the 
course of Vietnam negotiations for WTO membership (the demands under the Vietnam-US 
BTA will be discussed in the next part). Although there was no specific requirement for 
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building a competition law in the requirements for accession, it was implied if Vietnam could 
not offer a comprehensive legal system to meet the basic demands of opening their market, the 
length of negotiations for membership would have been far beyond what Vietnam underwent in 
reality. 
 
As analyzed in previous part about the interaction between competition policy (including 
competition law) and trade liberalization, opening markets can not happen in a centrally 
planned economy where heavy State intervention is present and SOEs make up the majority of 
national economic activities. If there is no competition in a domestic market, opening the 
market will “kill” domestic enterprises even before the “battle” between domestic and foreign 
enterprises commences. 
 
Understanding this very basic knowledge about the necessity of competition facilitation in trade 
liberalization and originating from the actual needs of national economic activities at that time, 
a number of laws related to investment and trade facilitation were drafted and approved by 
Vietnam’s policymakers and offered to negotiating partners. On the one hand, those laws 
showed Vietnam’s commitment to improve its legal system to meet with WTO requirements 
about legal transparency and appropriateness. On the other hand, Vietnamese policymakers 
realized a need to translate the basic requirements of WTO entry into concrete domestic 
reforms, including the introduction of competition policy, in the course of concluding these 
negotiations. As such, the process of negotiating entry to the WTO was an important driver of 
the development of competition policy in Vietnam. 
 
2.6 Vietnam – the US BTA negotiation and conclusion 
 
The Vietnam – US Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) was signed in July 2000. Former Vice 
Minister Vu Khoan described it as the “longest bridge connecting two sides of the Pacific in the 
history”98.This agreement had been made possible by the US lifting its 19-year-long-trade 
embargo on Vietnam in 1994 and the two countries normalizing political relations in 1995. 
Negotiations on the BTA started in 1995 and were concluded initially in negotiations in 1999. 
                                                 
98
 Vietnam – U.S trade after 10 years of signing the BTA, 2011. (Thương mại Việt Mỹ sau 10 năm ký kết Hiệp 
định thương mại song phương) available at the website 
 http://vovworld.vn/vi-vn/Binh-luan/Thuong-mai-Viet-My-sau-10-nam-ky-ket-Hiep-dinh-thuong-mai-song-
phuong/61667.vov  
 52 
After further discussion and exchanges of letters, the Agreement was signed on July 13, 2000. 
The US Congress ratified the BTA in October 2001 and Vietnam’s National Assembly ratified 
it in November 2001.
99
 
 
Vietnam entered into the BTA with a legal and policy system that was still heavily influenced 
by its previous system, with its emphasis on central-planning, state-dominated economic 
activity.
100
 The BTA was much like the WTO agreement, including extensive obligations 
related to tariffs and quotas and to transparency, dispute settlement, investment, intellectual 
property protection, market access for services, and business facilitation.
101
 The Ministry of 
Justice estimated that close to 100 laws and regulations had to be rewritten or developed to meet 
the BTA requirements.
102
 
 
Item 2, Article 5 of Chapter III of the US-Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement states, “Where a 
Party's monopoly supplier competes, either directly or through an affiliated company, in the 
supply of a service outside the scope of its monopoly rights and which is subject to that Party's 
specific commitments, the Party shall ensure that such a supplier does not abuse its monopoly 
position to act in its territory in a manner inconsistent with such commitments”.103 State 
monopoly was secured in special sector as exclusive monopoly. However, Vietnam committed 
to substantial market access for US service providers in more than 20 sectors
104
 over a period 
from Year 2 (December 2003) through Year 7 (December 2008).
105
 
 
More importantly, BTA obligations injected a strong requirement for Vietnam to reform the 
legal system within a specific “roadmap”. In particular, the BTA placed high significance on 
greater transparency for laws, regulations, and administrative procedures. The BTA stressed 
“upon entry into force, the BTA required the prompt, regular publication in an official journal 
of all laws, regulations, … to be made readily available to the public before being enforceable. 
In addition, it required that Vietnam give US nationals and the US Government the opportunity 
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to comment on draft laws, regulations, …”.106 It is evident that there is a very bold difference 
between the loose and encouragement-oriented approach set out by political or economic 
organizations in the region, namely APEC or ASEAN, and the clear, detailed and ponderable 
requirements/conditions in the Vietnam-US BTA.  
 
Playing the role as the “stepping stone” of Vietnam to the WTO, most of the legal and 
administrative reforms required for WTO accession were initiated as part of the BTA 
implementation.
107
 STAR
108
-Vietnam (2007) argued that market access obligations were the 
most significant difference between the Vietnam-US BTA and WTO entry. To put it simply, the 
BTA required directly only that market access needed to be open for US service providers and 
investors, not all foreigners. Actually, the US was the founding member of the WTO and has a 
very strong voice and lots of influence in the biggest trade organization on the globe. 
Vietnamese policymakers therefore, understood that meeting the requirements under the BTA, 
on the one hand, would pave the way for partial legal and trade reforms. On the other hand, 
Vietnam also had to satisfy very precise and challenging demands from the US as an economic 
partner. 
 
Taking a broad view of the BTA contents and how Vietnam improved its legal system in the 
period 2002-2006,
109
 it is evident that a number of fundamental laws were drafted and adopted 
to meet with the intermediate requirements specified in the BTA. While the Vietnam 
Competition Law was not required directly by the BTA, it helped to bring into force the BTA in 
an indirect manner so as to facilitate market access, trade liberalization and ultimately to reach 
the goal of the BTA. As roughly indicated in the Introduction of the Competition Law, the law 
was implied as a comprehensive and framework law that was a legal instrument to preserve the 
competition environment providing that other regulatory laws are in synthetic effect. In short, 
the VCL was an important part of the overall reforms to the regulatory system governing the 
market-oriented economy and needed to facilitate the proper functioning of other laws and 
regulations directly required by the BTA. In this aspect, the BTA did create a certain “pressure” 
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and motivation to enact the VCL (2004) as it went hand in hand with a package of numerous 
sectorial laws (namely the Investment Law, the Enterprises Law, the IPR Law, the Commercial 
Law, and so on). 
 
When looking at the external factors in the enactment of the VCL (2004) among which was the 
Vietnam-US BTA, Vietnam’s commitment to open market access and to liberalize trade is 
evident. What is more, comments and contributions from US experts were taken into account 
and reflected in the process of drafting the VCL (2004). Therefore, as with the ASEAN and 
APEC processes, a degree of diffusion of knowledge and ideas is evident in the negotiations of 
both WTO accession and Vietnam-US BTA negotiations. While the Vietnam-US BTA did not 
stipulate requirement for competition policy it was needed to support the other requirements. 
US experts were therefore instrumental in providing ideas and knowledge from which 
Vietnam’s policymakers could construct their own competition law. 
  
 Conclusion 
 
Before the enactment of the VCL (2004), there were many forces pushing policymakers 
towards this process. Firstly, it is evident that the VCL originated in domestic economic needs 
for reform and was supported by the political backdrop since Doimoi (1986). The considerable 
reforms in political thinking of the Party and the State during this period created a new 
intellectual atmosphere where competition law was viewed as being able to benefit the 
operation of the whole economy. Policymakers increasingly realized competition policy was a 
necessary legal instrument for the Government to regulate monopolies in the market, raise the 
efficiency of business activities and tackle issues arising from unfair competition or competition 
restraint activities among competitors.  
 
Secondly, it is also evident that there has been a wave of proliferating competition laws in the 
world since the 1980s and especially in developing countries and CIS countries after 1990. A 
number of external factors, therefore, including entering into ASEAN and APEC in 1995 and 
1998 respectively, applying for WTO membership in 1995 and concluding the BTA with the 
US in 2001, are important mechanisms for pushing competition policy forward in Vietnam. 
While there is no direct evidence or statement about a compulsory requirement for Vietnam to 
adopt the VCL, these negotiations and interactions created the necessity to enact the VCL and 
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provided the forum for norm diffusion and knowledge sharing. Therefore, both internal and 
external forces contributed to the creation of competition policy and law in Vietnam. 
 
The next Chapter explores the interactive relationship between the internal and external 
determinants listed above. It will show where and how they conflicted or complimented each 
other and how this interaction resulted in the competition policy and law environment we see in 
Vietnam today. 
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CHAPTER III  
HARMONIZING THE INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL DRIVING FORCES IN 
THE ENACTMENT OF THE VIETNAM COMPETITION LAW (2004) 
 
In the previous chapter, both internal and external driving forces were indicated and analyzed to 
test their weight and influence in the enactment of the VCL (2004). As a result, none of them 
outweighed the others and all those composed a consistent bunch of determinants. This chapter 
focuses on the focal point of the thesis – the harmonization of the internal and external factors 
towards the promulgation of the VCL (2004). Before tackling the concern about the 
convergence and divergence (why and how) of the two categories of factors, the first section 
will analyse the historic transplant of competition law over the world.  
 
In the 1950s, fewer than 10 jurisdictions around the globe had competition regimes in any form. 
But since 1980, over 80 competition laws have been constructed and brought into life. Today, 
people talk much about the competition models of progressive economies like the US, EU and 
Japan. Dating back to history, while the US took the pioneering role in legislating and enforcing 
competition law and policy, the EU came later and Japan was the last among those three 
representatives. 
 
Canada and the US are the first countries in the world to adopt and implement a national 
antitrust law, 1889 and 1890 respectively.
110
 Today, there are over 110 competition policy 
regimes in the world.
111
 According to Prof. William Kovacic, former Commissioner of the US 
Federal Trade Commission, the emergence and development of competition policy is a 
remarkable story.  
 
In the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries competition law ideas spread to and were intensely 
debated in Germany and other European countries.
112
 Germany was the first country in Europe 
to enact the so-called “competition law” (Regulation against abuse of economic power 
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positions) in 1923. After the two world wars, competition laws, which initially served for 
economic purposes, were temporarily set aside to make way for much bigger political concerns. 
 
Since 1957, marked by the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC), the 
Community’s Competition Law, which was originally influenced by the German competition 
model, has evolved and has now become a competing model to the US model.
113
 
 
As Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean Francois Richard (2003) remarked in the 
“Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect”, 47 EUR. L. REV, “Law-making 
should come from within, not without. Legislation should respond to contextual problems that 
need to be solved. Law is not ideally generated by outsiders who say: We have this law and you 
should too”114 
 
As mentioned before, the pool of experts and researchers on competition policy generally come 
from international organizations or practitioners of competition agencies around the world 
(mainly from developed countries). However, there remains a huge lack of empirical evidence 
in this field. As mentioned in the first sections on this thesis, the basic rationale for 
implementing competition policy in Vietnam can be gleaned from the general consensus in the 
literature on the importance of competition policy to the promotion of a market economy and 
opening to international trade and investment. 
 
The adoption of competition laws is undoubtedly linked to the wave of neo-
liberal economic reforms introduced since the 1980’s and, in particular, to the 
issues raised as a result of privatization. It is also part of the broader 
proliferation of liberal democracies and market-oriented economics becoming 
the dominant ideological models in the wake of the collapse of the communist 
bloc.
115
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Chadwick Teo (2003) explains the meaning of competition policy in promoting economic 
growth on the basis of collecting and developing ideas or contributions from different sources 
such as Dutz (2002); Nickell (1996); and, Blundell, Griffith and Van Reenen (1995). In 
particular, there are four key reasons: (i) thanks to competition among businesses, consumers 
have more choices of goods and services at a lower price and consequently more and more are 
consumed and produced; (ii) in the context of properly implementing competition policy, 
efficiency and productivity are promoted; (iii) competition “pushes” enterprises to innovate 
unstoppingly in order to be not outdated and (iv) competition facilitates restructuring in 
sectors.
116
 
 
Hoekman & Mavroidis (2002) argue “there are two major decisions to be taken by governments 
with respect to competition law: (i) whether (when) and how much to invest in such disciplines; 
and (ii) how to design and enforce the rules”.117  
 
To some extent, Competition Law can be regarded as “the law of laws” as its coverage is very 
wide and can be applied (in almost jurisdictions) to different sectors. In fact, competition law is 
often a very comprehensive framework so that it provides fundamental regulations on 
anticompetitive acts irrespective of specific industries. On the one hand, competition policy 
obviously helps foster economic growth. On the other hand, competition policy is still 
something quite new to developing economies especially those in the process of transition. Teo 
(2003) concluded, “as experience in developed countries show, competition laws take time to 
implement. ...competition laws should be introduced carefully by developing countries”.118 
 
The adoption of the Vietnam Competition Law in 2004 has been widely supported by 
economists. Domestically the VCL is seen as a breakthrough in the course of national economic 
integration into the region and the world. It is fair to say that competition is not the key element 
affecting this course but it is one of the most decisive factors in opening the market economy 
supported by trade liberalization and sectorial deregulation.  
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This chapter finds that competition law has been transplanted in different ways. As for some 
developed countries, it originated from the domestic actual needs of the economic activities and 
also came as a part of learning experiences and lessons from the predecessors. Nevertheless, 
developing countries were either under commitment to establish competition legislation under 
the framework of a bilateral or regional trade agreement or under the force of fulfilling a 
specific condition (a way of “give and take”). Vietnam does not fall within any of listed above 
scenarios. Both inside and outside elements exerted impact on the process of drafting and 
adopting the competition law. 
I. Overview of the Vietnam Competition Law (2004) 
 
The 4
th
 session of the 10
th
 Congress of the Vietnam National Assembly issued Resolution 
19/1998/QH10 on 20 December 1998. This resolution covered the law-making program of 1999 
and authorized the Ministry of Trade to chair the competition act drafting commission. 
 
The competition act drafting commission was established on April 12
th
 2000 under Decision 
number 0621/2000/QD-BTM of the Minister of Trade. Attending the drafting commission were 
senior officials and experts from the National Assembly Office, Government Office, Ministry of 
Trade, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Planning and Investment, Ministry of Finance, 
Governmental Price Committee, Vietnam lawyer Association, Vietnam Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry, and the Foreign Trade University.
119
 
 
The Competition Law Project was initiated by Resolution No. 12/2002/QH11 (16 December 
2002) of the National Assembly on the Agenda of Constructing Laws ordinances in the 
National Assembly (Session XI). On that ground, the Prime Minister issued Decision No. 
35/2003/QD-TTg on the 6
th
 of March 2003 which detailed the assignment to the Ministry of 
Trade as the single agency to host drafting of the Vietnam Competition Law in collaboration 
with other agencies.
120
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The drafting board began by translating competition laws in ten economies (China, Thailand, 
Croatia, Bulgari, Turkey, France, South Korea, Japan, Canada and Chinese Taipei) at the same 
time as looking at other models of competition law from the UNCTAD and the OECD.
121
 
According to WTO statistics,
122
 by 2001 there were about 80 WTO countries had competition 
laws at hand. More strikingly, 50 developing countries and transition countries were out of that 
number.  
 
Typically, these laws provide remedies to deal with a range of anti-competitive practices, 
including price fixing and other cartel arrangements, abuses of a dominant position or 
monopolization, mergers that limit competition, and agreements between suppliers and 
distributors (“vertical agreements”) that foreclose markets to new competitors. The concept of 
competition “policy” includes competition laws in addition to other measures aimed at 
promoting competition in the national economy, such as sectorial regulations and privatization 
policies.
123
 
 
Translating the competition laws of the above listed economies showed lawmakers in Vietnam 
the importance of making an effort to catch up with the prevailing tendency in the world. 
Around the same time Vietnam officially applied for WTO membership (1995). Building a new 
law such as the competition law post-2000 showed Vietnam’s “good will” and determination to 
move closer to world trade norms and standards and that the Vietnamese economy was 
converging on established practices. Competition actually became one of the “Singapore issues” 
but was finally dropped out of the Doha Agenda in 2004 in the WTO.
124
 However, this did not 
mean competition could be left behind. Practice showed that competition found its own way 
into bilateral or regional free trade agreements from then on. To put it simply, WTO members 
could not reach agreement on competition but they could find other channels to promote it in 
light of the significant role of competition to economic growth.  
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The selection of the above mentioned ten economies gave a selection of competition models for 
Vietnamese policymakers to pick and choose from: those economies that used to have the same 
economic system as Vietnam (Russia, China, Bulgaria); other countries in the region (Japan, 
South Korea) that had built up years of experience at implementing competition; those small-
scale economies like Vietnam that had “fresh experiences” building and implementing 
competition law (Thailand and Chinese Taipei); and finally,  those countries applying a Civil 
Law system like Vietnam and who had established competition regimes for a good period of 
time (Canada, France or Germany). 
 
In the three years from 2000 to 2002, the Drafting Board organized more than ten seminars 
welcoming a variety of experts from Australia, Canada, Chinese Taipei, France, Japan, 
Germany, Russia, the U.S. and UNCTAD to present their advice and consultative opinions to 
different drafts of the law.
125
 This was a very obvious signal of Vietnam’s “willingness” to learn 
from the experiences of other developed competition regimes. Actually, this was also a good 
way for the competition lawmakers to update and keep track with the development of the world 
at that time. Although differences in economy size, development level and mechanism of 
operating the national economies; inviting the so-called leading agencies or Russia – a “big 
brother” of Vietnam in the past appeared to be very helpful to persuade the members of the 
National Assembly later on. Because incorporating appropriate contributions from foreign 
experts would be excellent evidences proving that the Competition Law of Vietnam would 
respond to the necessity of the national economy itself and at the same time be in line with the 
general tendency in the world. Until now, from the legal construction culture of Vietnam, it is 
often easier for lawmakers to show the National Assembly members (who finalize the approval 
of almost laws) that the legal text well reflects domestic needs and keeps up with world 
standard. At this point, internal and external ideas meet. 
 
In his Report on explaining the Competition Law Project presented at the Government Meeting 
dated 28-29 January 2004, Mr. Truong Dinh Tuyen, former Minister of Trade, indicated the 
following three guiding principles throughout the process of drafting the law: 
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 Principle 1: Grasp thoroughly and institutionalize all directions, guidance and policies of 
the Party in developing a socialist market-oriented economy with State management 
 
As clearly indicated in the Resolution of the VIII Party National Congress [1996] the “Market 
mechanism requires a healthy, legitimate and fair civil competition environment. Competition 
serves the purpose of national development but does not result in a series of failures, waste of 
human resources and so on”.126  
 
This Party Resolution brought in two affirmative viewpoints on the market mechanism and the 
objective of competition. In this approach, a competitive environment is a perquisite condition 
for operating a market mechanism. At the same time, competition aims at developing the 
nation. These two concepts appear very simple and general but represent a highly significant 
change in economic thinking of the think tank elite. 
 
In addition, competition at that time was looked at from a domestic perspective rather than 
something coming from abroad. To put it simply, “competition” has a quite narrow coverage, as 
it was defined not to result in serial failure while by its nature, “competition” creates losers and 
winners. In case of severe competition among firms, the weak one can be easily the loser with 
little or no market power. 
 
Though general and simple as it was, dating back the time of 1990s, Vietnam was a fresh 
learner in the transitional economy context. Inclusion of “competition” in the Party Resolution 
was also a good signal showcasing its “open policy”. Comparatively, competition was nothing 
during the centrally planed economy before 1986. Ten years later, competition was recognized 
in the market mechanism and via the goal of national development. “Competition” gradually 
gained its stance in the economy. 
 
Then the Resolution of the 9th Party Congress continued affirming and giving more guidance to 
“enhancing the skeleton role of orienting and regulating the national economy on the market… 
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Identify a time duration of reasonable and effective subsidy/protection towards a number of 
substantial products, be proactive in preparation for international market integration. Limit 
and control monopoly in business.”127 
 
Party Resolutions often incorporate ongoing missions and map out upcoming visions. The 9
th
 
Party Resolution directly indicated the guidance on limiting and controlling monopolies. At a 
broader level, the Party was even aware that as a result of competition, the elimination of 
subsidies or protection should be there after a certain period and more importantly this would 
give a momentum for the integration into the international market. 
Although the expression and the interpretation in the Party Resolution was not really precise 
and was not phrased like modern concepts or norms, the content and the meaning were very 
progressive. 
 
If the VIII Party Resolution regarded competition as a domestic element, it became a bridge to 
international integration in the IX.  
 
 Principle 2: Effective control over monopolies 
At that time, the proportion of state sectors in the economy was still high and in many sectors, 
the State still held monopoly position. In parallel with the economic integration, multinational 
companies started to invest, produce and do business in Vietnam. Those companies working in 
certain sectors also held dominant positions in the market. Therefore, the Competition Law was 
seen as being able to pave the way for controlling monopolies and facilitating fair competition 
among market players.
128
 
 
If Principle 1 is mostly related to the political will of high-ranking leaders Principle 2 reflects 
the status quo of the market with state monopoly companies in competition with an increasing 
number of multinational companies. 
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Whether the market is monopolized by the state sector or dominated by big foreign companies, 
such a situation would be harmful for the entire economy. This Principle therefore deals with 
the very fundamental components of a competition bill. 
  
Principle 3: Ensure consistence with other legal regulations of Vietnam on competition 
At that time, regulations on competition were scattered in different legal documents such as the 
Civil Act, the Foreign Investment Law, the Enterprise Law, the Cooperatives Law, the State 
Enterprise Law, the Commerce Law, the Credit Organization Law, the Insurance Law, and so 
on. It was therefore important to keep in mind that the Competition Law could not conflict or 
overlap with other regulations and the concurrent documents in effect.
129
 
 
These three principles form the basis for how the Competition Law was drafted. To understand 
how these principles came about the thesis now turns to an analysis of the internal and external 
driving forces for establishing the competition law. This is divided into two main sections. The 
first looks at where the internal and external driving forces diverged and how this impacted the 
founding principles. The second looks at where internal and external driving forces converged 
and how this impacted the founding principles. This is followed by a brief discussion of 
harmonization. 
II. Divergence between the internal and external driving forces 
 
Divergence here can be understood as the difference/conflict between the internal infrastructure 
and the requirements from the external partners or the external “ecology”. To some extent, they 
include the gaps between Vietnam’s development level (in terms of legal, economic and 
political aspects) and the worldwide standard of a modern competition law. At another level, 
divergence can be understood as the promotion of certain policy and legal prescriptions by 
external agencies and the domestic requirements for specific regulations to meet domestic 
needs. In case of the VCL (2004), divergence can be witnessed from three main perspectives, 
institutional, administrative and enforcement. 
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 2.1 From the institutional perspective 
 
The institutional perspective deals more with the legal infrastructure of Vietnam in preparation 
for building and adopting the VCL. At the first glance, Vietnam appears not well prepared for 
that event. The process of building a new law is actually very complicated, time consuming and 
calls for a lot of resources. This was even tougher because the Competition Law introduced 
articles around an extremely new concept—“competition” among businesses. 
 
Kovacic (2001) argues “Institutional improvements - such as the establishment of effective 
judicial systems – must precede or be undertaken in parallel with substantive law reforms”.130 
In Vietnam’s case, a number of institutional deficits meant that there was some divergence 
between international best practices and the VCL (2004). Put another way, the VCL was 
designed to be functional in Vietnam under the then conditions of institutional development. 
Institutional un-preparedness issues relating to the VCL (2004) can be divided into three groups 
as below: 
 
- 1. The framework law and the lack of detailed provisions 
 
Framework laws, acts and ordinances are issued by the National Assembly, which is the single 
and highest body of the legislative branch. Those framework documents only stipulate the 
general provisions so to bring the laws into effect guiding sub-laws must be drafted and adopted 
by the Government and the Ministries. Therefore, there is always a “lag” between constructing 
a law and implementing it. Actually, without issuance of a package of sub-laws, the competent 
agencies would not be able to take enforcement action on a law passed through the National 
Assembly. Therefore, detailed provisions were required to bring the effect of the law into 
practice and to redress any deficit with international practices. 
 
- 2. The framework law and the “out-of-phase” of the objects of application 
 
Though the 1992 Constitution (and the amended version 2001) recognized the establishment of 
enterprises of any type in the market economy and their equality before the law, in reality there 
existed a number of laws regulating the operations of different types of enterprises. For 
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example, the SOE Law was designed to regulate the establishment and operations of SOEs; the 
FDI Law was aimed at FDI enterprises; the Cooperatives Law was for cooperatives (which can 
be understood as the collective economic sector) while the Enterprise Law encompassed 
enterprises capitalized by private sector (which can be understood as the private capitalist 
economic sector). Those four laws were applied on the basis of the capital ownership structure 
of the enterprise and excluded other types of enterprises in the economy at that time, namely 
“mixed” enterprises under Ministries (such as the Ministry of National Defense, the Ministry of 
Public Security, the Labor Union, and so on). This has led to enterprises of different capital 
ownership competing in the market not based on their real capabilities but depending on which 
type of enterprise they belonged to. The institutional basis for the enactment of the competition 
law therefore contained loopholes due to the concurrent laws based on enterprise ownership 
structure. Unfair competition and monopoly can be seen in the different laws meaning 
application of the VCL diverged from international practice due to existing laws. 
 
- 3. Gaps between the legal provisions and actual economic development  
 
Gaps between the legal provisions and level of economic development are understandable in the 
context of drafting the VCL (2004). These gaps are still problematic at present due to the legal 
culture in Vietnam. To put it simply, it takes several years to draft and receive approval from 
the National Assembly for a law to come into effect. In the case of the VCL, if counting from 
the date of establishing the drafting board, it took 4 years in total with 15 draft versions before 
getting approved. The final version incorporated a huge number of opinions and comments 
from the community, enterprises, academia and ministries/branches together with international 
experts. This lag leads to the law becoming slightly outdated. 
 
The legal culture in Vietnam also requires that everything needs to be “quantified”. For 
example, in the case of US or EU standard competition law, the “effect doctrine” has been 
applied in most cases to analyze the antitrust or merger cases. In Vietnam, this standard is 
invalid. At the time of drafting the law lawmakers had to imagine and estimate what will occur 
years later and set the rules within certain thresholds. Vietnamese lawmakers explained that this 
is to limit the power of the implementing agency. This however, created more harm than good. 
The rigid “quantitative provisions” of the legal document led to the fact that when the law came 
into effect, such “thresholds” became inappropriate and could not reflect exactly and fully what 
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was going on in real economic activities. Such weakness impeded the enactment of the VCL 
(2004) and led to divergence between international best practices. This has also occurred with 
the Vietnam-US BTA and WTO membership negotiations that required policy transparency and 
a synergy in legal system. 
 
In fact, the Commercial Law (enacted in 1997 and in effect from 1998) had already taken a 
major step toward building a competition system
131
 as it provided for “competition in 
commerce”.132 Article 8.2 in particular banned “speculation to attain market control; dumping; 
defaming other business entities; obstructing, enticing, bribing, or threatening the staff or 
customers of other business entities; infringing trademarks or other industry property rights; and 
other unlawful acts”.133 This shows Vietnam at that time was following the trend of the basic 
concepts of competition but did not have a clear boundary between unfair competition and 
antitrust (simply antimonopoly). The confusion made it more urgent to come up with a 
competition law separately but it was also an obstacle as the institutional basis was not concrete 
enough for Vietnam to build up a comprehensive competition law. 
 
As stressed in previous sections, there is a close relationship between competition law and other 
regulatory laws. A competition law needs to be a framework law and work like an umbrella to 
regulate anticompetitive acts in all sectors. Vietnam’s lack of experience in institutional 
building (due to the legacy of a long period of closed market economy) was the first barrier to 
the enactment of the VCL (2004) and led to divergence between international practices, those 
external forces, and the actual reality of Vietnam’s competition law. 
 
 2.2 From the administrative modeling perspective 
 
The second perspective that shows divergence between Vietnam’s competition law and the 
external forces that shaped that law is the administrative modeling perspective. Most parts of 
the economy in Vietnam were traditionally operated via administrative order. This poses a lot of 
difficulties for competition implementation activities under the scope of the VCL. The 
implications of international economic integration required Vietnam to let economic activities 
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operate under the market mechanism. More specifically, enterprises had to compete and comply 
with market rules instead of following state administrative orders. 
 
This is the most striking and noteworthy difference between the internal context and the 
“indirect pressure” from the external factors. Once becoming the official member of such 
regional organizations like ASEAN or APEC; whether under binding commitment or not, 
Vietnam was still self aware that if it did not change the old rigid system of a centralized 
planning economy that leaned mainly on administrative orders and deep intervention in almost 
all economic activities, it would not be able to integrate with other members. However, the 
legacy of a long established system could not be erased overnight. Therefore, the ongoing use 
of administrative orders has complicated the drafting, implementation and functioning of the 
VCL and led to some divergence with those ideas proliferated by external organizations. 
 
 2.3 From enforcement mechanism perspective 
 
The final perspective that shows how the drafting of the VCL diverged is the enforcement 
mechanism perspective. The best practices of developed competition authorities over the world 
indicate their strong power and great independence in conducting investigation and case 
handling. As specified in the Model Law on Competition initiated by UNCTAD (2000), “the 
trend in most of the competition authorities created in the recent past (usually in developing 
countries and countries in transition) is to award them as much administrative independence as 
possible. This feature is very important because it protects the Authority from political 
influence”.134  
 
This point reflects clearly the divergence between the contextual conditions in Vietnam and the 
requirements of externality. The Vietnamese economy still includes room for state-owned 
enterprises but the Competition Board (then the Vietnam Competition Administrative 
Department) was established under the Ministry of Trade.
135
 This Ministry was assigned two 
big functions over consumer protection and trade remedies. Incorporating those three 
widespread and new functions into one agency was a very basic “mistake”. In the case of 
Australia, the US and other jurisdictions, there has been one commission in charge of both 
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competition and consumer protection. However, trade remedies have been placed in another 
specific area. As such, enforcement of competition law is still a challenge in Vietnam and 
further complicated by the lack of independence of the competition authority. 
 
Moreover, considering the impact of ASEAN we see that for Vietnam to complete 
commitments under AFTA, it had to open its market and strictly follow the roadmap on cutting 
tariffs. Domestic enterprises were to play on the level playing field with not only other domestic 
ones but also with foreign enterprises and corporations. The lack of policy transparency and 
weaknesses in the legal construction in Vietnam have hindered the enforcement of the VCL 
(2004) and led to some divergence with international practices or at least with the practices 
espoused by external forces that promoted the construction of competition policy in Vietnam. 
 III. Convergence between the internal and external driving forces 
 3.1 Why convergence? 
The above section showed that the VCL did diverge from the type of competition policy 
promoted by external forces due to the domestic economic, administrative and institutional 
conditions in Vietnam. However, it is also apparent that there was a high degree of convergence 
with international competition regimes in the drafting of the VCL. 
Convergence in the scope, coverage and enforcement of competition laws worldwide can be 
attributed to a number of elements, such as: (i) the widespread trend towards liberalization of 
markets and adoption of competition policies; (ii) greater emphasis upon consumer welfare, 
efficiency and competitiveness objectives in the provision or application of competition laws; 
(iii) greater similarity in economic analyses and enforcement techniques; (iv) the universal 
condemnation of collusive practices; (v) tightening up of enforcement; (vi) a more prominent 
role for competition authorities in advocating competition principles in the application of other 
governmental policies; (vii) the strengthening of international consultations and cooperation.
136
 
According to Eleanor M. Fox (2007), in an era of globalization and convergence of antitrust 
laws, “universal standards” normally refers to the standards of the United States and Europe. 
For the developing countries, they must also consider the benefits of their own perspective. 
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However, substantial convergence can be achieved and will naturally occur even in the face of 
both perspectives.
137
 
In the context of Vietnam’s national economic development and clear awareness of high-
ranking leaders about the necessity of promulgating the competition law as an effective 
instrument to achieve economic goals coupled with the spillover of competition bills in the 
world during the 1990s, convergence was well reflected in the enactment of the VCL. 
In the face of above mentioned divergence between the internal and external driving forces, 
Vietnam did and has found ways to absorb advances and best practice of experienced 
competition jurisdictions while keeping in mind the status quo of domestic development and 
long run strategies. 
On the one hand, the general directions incorporated in the 1992 Constitution (amended in 
2001) and specified in the Party Congressional Resolutions (ranging from Session VI to IX) 
were the “lodestar” in implementing the Competition Law Project. Additionally, the actual 
requirement for economic development drove Vietnam to apply competition in the market. 
On the other hand, a number of external pressures from the membership of regional and 
international organizations within the period of 1990 to 2000 and especially the application for 
WTO official membership pushed Vietnam to draft and enact the VCL in due course to meet 
with the national context and objectives and to integrate into the global and regional economy. 
In a small comparative analysis of competition laws in four ASEAN country members, 
Sivalingam (2006) argued “Singapore and Vietnam introduced competition legislation to 
promote trade and deeper integration with the American and world economy”.138 This reveals 
that international economic integration was a proxy for convergence with international 
competition standards in the enactment of the VCL (2004).  
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 3.2 How to converge? 
The passing of the VCL can therefore also be seen as an important part of Vietnam’s regulatory 
convergence with the region. Entering ASEAN in 1995 exemplified the willingness and 
readiness of Vietnam to join a regional economic, political and social environment. The 
application for WTO membership with both pros and cons for the then Vietnamese economy 
showcased further the desire of Vietnam to integrate into the biggest trade organization in the 
world. 
This was done because policymakers came to believe that “freeing up the market has [would] 
hold great economic benefits for developing and transitional countries”.139 This was predicted 
by Vietnamese policymakers who expected that following the ‘more integrated route’140 would 
allow Vietnam to intermingle with the world economy for greater prosperity. 
In light of the above divergence between the internal and external factors, the question of how 
Vietnam could converge, and therefore become more integrated, became apparent. There were 
big gaps between the conditions for competition in the domestic market, the multiple 
stakeholders and those who had the highest power to approve the law and the requirements and 
expectations from and the standards of the relevant foreign partners. Looking over the 15 drafts 
of the VCL (2004), it is clear that right up until the 7
th
 draft the drafted law still followed the 
Model Law on Competition introduced by UNCTAD in 2000 and reflected the very key and 
appropriate provisions of a competition law. However, from the 8
th
 draft on, it started to go in a 
different direction with a lot of modifications and even unreasonable ones that contravened 
world standards.  
This can be explained by the fact that the first 7 drafts were done by the Drafting Board with 
various consultations from international experts during the period 2000 to 2003. However, after 
the 6
th
 of February 2003 the 8
th
 draft was sent to the People’s Committees at provincial levels 
and the local Departments of Trade and Tourism (currently Departments of Industry and 
Trade)
141
 for comments and contributions. Though the MOT received a lot of different opinions 
about the detailed provisions of the draft and these transformed the process of drafting; the final 
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draft well incorporated those opinions while still keeping the “soul” of the competition law 
from the beginning. 
IV. Harmonizing the internal and external driving forces 
 
This thesis has asked which factors from the domestic domain drove the Ministry of Trade to 
prepare the document submitted to the Government and then for the National Assembly to 
include the Competition Law Project into the legal construction agenda. In general, there are 
some key findings: (i) the Ministry of Trade were directly engaged in external economic 
activities so they were well aware of the inefficiency and low competitiveness of the national 
economy, especially the shortcomings from the activities of SOEs; (ii) Vietnam expressed 
clearly its strategic goal of international economic integration, which means that it had to open 
the market and accept competition at both levels (competition among domestic enterprises and 
competition between domestic enterprises and foreign enterprises). The requirements for 
opening the market became increasingly robust in the presence of multinational companies and 
corporations. It was therefore deemed necessary to respond to these concerns by introducing a 
competition law to regulate monopolies in the domestic market and enhance competitiveness of 
domestic enterprises in an effort to compete against foreign enterprises with their advantageous 
position in the global and Vietnamese economies.  
 
This leads to two main findings: self-awareness and pressure. First, when joining a game, 
players must obey certain rules. There is pressure from other players to do this or that. Second, 
after joining a game a player will find that they need to do this or that to catch up 
with/harmonize/follow the other players. In the case Vietnam joining the process of regional 
integration there is both indirect pressure from the other players to follow the rules of the 
international trading order and self-awareness of the necessity of domestic reforms to make 
Vietnamese businesses and the Vietnamese economy more competitive. As shown in the 
analysis above, there is a very small boundary between the two different driving forces for 
change. The story of the drafting and passing of the VCL (2004) is a story of both pressures to 
adhere to regional and international rules and norms as well as a self-awareness that adopting 
international practices, such as the implementation of a competition policy, would increase the 
strength of the Vietnamese economy.  
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On the one hand, incentives and urgency originated from the actual needs of the economy (from 
the activities of enterprises operating in the economy); the existing and lengthy weaknesses of 
business activities; the determination for international economic integration accompanied by the 
market opening policy; the reform in economic and political thinking about 
regulating/controlling monopolies and facilitating [natural] competition with a few exceptions 
in several special sectors. The necessity of adopting a competition law lied in both the macro 
economic reforms and the international economic integration process.  
 
On the other hand, Vietnam was under some pressure from other partners. Though not indicated 
directly as shown in official statements and documents of the Government/State/Party, the 
external factors determining the promulgation of VCL (2004) can be attributed to the following: 
(i) the increasing proliferation of competition laws throughout the East Asian region and all 
over the world especially among developing countries since the 1990s created a kind of 
“domino effect”; (ii) the active role of the US the EU (within the regional scope only), the 
UNCTAD in disseminating the role of competition in the market economy via their various 
types of assistance spread knowledge and diffused norms; (iii) Vietnam’s application for WTO 
membership in 1995 creates a lot urgency in Vietnam to improve the legal system and the 
business environment; (iv) a few years of being members of ASEAN and APEC (especially 
APEC) showed that competition policy and especially competition law had become a popular 
topic on the meeting agendas; (iv) the commencement of the Vietnam-US BTA released a lot of 
requirements around establishing a legal framework to regulate anticompetitive behaviors in the 
market and to introduce transparency in economic and commercial activities with a focus on the 
public sector. 
 
In fact, the VCL (2004) was in the track of competition development in the region and was an 
“example” for Vietnam to show their efforts and commitment to opening the market and to 
welcome investment and the operation of foreign enterprises. This ultimately helped increase 
the competitiveness of the whole economy. 
 
To weigh up the importance of the external forces for change we can ask what would likely 
have happened if some of these forces had not been present. For example, if Vietnam did not 
join ASEAN or APEC, did not sign the BTA with the US or prepare for WTO membership 
negotiations, would a competition law have been necessary? Or, without recognizing the 
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weaknesses of the economy and without setting the goal of international economic integration, 
would Vietnam have come up with an idea about competition? Clearly, from this perspective no 
single force is enough to explain these changes on their own. No group of factors has enough 
“weight” to explain adequately the story of enacting the VCL (2004). The foundation of the 
move toward competition policy was Vietnam’s awareness but certain elements of the VCL 
were clearly motivated by outsiders. In sum there is a good combination of internal efforts and 
external support.  
 
Eleanor Fox (2007) suggested that a good antitrust law (developed by developing countries) 
should respond to the social and economic context of individual countries. “Developing 
countries deserve an antitrust law that fits the facts of their markets and responds to their 
condition and needs. They deserve a law so designed and so characterized that their peoples 
will embrace it as sympathetic and legitimate rather reject it as foreign.”142 Michal Gal (2004) 
also added that political pressure could affect the adoption of a competition law.  
 
In the case of Vietnam, Carol V. Rose (1998) argues, “Vietnam never follows exactly one 
foreign legal model, but instead tries to pick among many. This comes from Vietnam’s history 
of struggle and protest against foreign invaders. Vietnam has a long history of creating its own 
state and legal framework, so it does not like to adopt a single foreign model”.143 This is clearly 
evident in the case of adopting competition policy in Vietnam. 
 
The below section will review the main contents of the VCL (2004) and the independency of 
the competition management agency stipulated in that law as “examples” showing the 
harmonization of the internal and external sites of ideas incorporated in the adoption of the 
VCL (2004). 
 4.1 Contents of the Vietnam Competition Law (2004) 
In terms of the VCL contents from an institutional perspective, Vietnam was the “late comer” 
so convergence was a wise choice to borrow available formulation then made appropriate 
adjustments to the concurrent level of development. 
                                                 
142
 Ibid, p125. 
143
 Ibid, p106. 
 75 
Basic contents covered by any competition act include abusive behaviors (abuse of monopoly 
or dominant position on the market), cartel (vertical and horizontal agreements) and M&A. As a 
matter of fact, all three key elements are reflected in the VCL as a way of absorbing “universal 
norms or standards”. With six chapters and 123 articles, the VCL (2004) covered well all the 
basic competition practices. What was different from other competition acts is the part on unfair 
competition. In reality, almost all other competition acts in the world regulate unfair trade 
practices in a separate law or incorporate this category of competition acts in legal texts on 
consumer protection. 
Vietnam’s legislative process is actually not a process of “writing a story”. Instead, the common 
tendency has been a process of learning and renewing law in Vietnam’s own way. Therefore, 
instead of developing a new framework law, it was better to learn from the predecessors (with 
their both failure and success) and to adapt this to local conditions. 
Carol V. Rose (1998) quoted a part in the speech of Prime Minister Vo Van Kiet to the  
1993 National Juridical Conference in Hanoi indicating the rationale behind Vietnam’s  “open 
door” policy toward legal assistance in this way: 
We lack many laws. In the economic field, which is a priority in legislation, a 
 legal framework still has to be worked out. With the open door policy, we 
able to contact various legal systems out of the countries which have a higher 
level of development in many aspects…we need to study what is suitable for our 
country to establish step by step a reliable framework for domestic and foreign 
investment, to ensure effectiveness of state management, and protect freedom 
and democratic rights of our citizens.
144
  
Recently, after eight years of enforcing the law, a lot of loopholes have been raised and 
criticized, for example, the market threshold of 30% on the relevant market stipulated in the 
2004 Competition Law challenged the competition authority when calculating the market share 
of the violating company. However, at that time, Vietnam “borrowed” this “quantifying” 
provision from Canada and Germany as it fitted with the legal system in Vietnam. In practice 
there are always detailed provisions with numbers in legal regulations in Vietnam. This is seen 
as “a safe way” to limit abuse of power by the state management agencies. For example, in this 
case, a lot of developed and experienced competition regimes used “effect doctrine” to 
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categorize anticompetitive acts but this approach is not appropriate with the common practice in 
Vietnam. 
 4.2 Independency of the competition agency 
  
As provided by the VCL (2004), “the head of the competition-managing agency shall be 
appointed or dismissed by the Prime Minister at the proposal of the Trade Minister”145 and “the 
head of the competition-managing agency shall be appointed or dismissed by the Prime 
Minister at the proposal of the Trade Minister”146. Those two items are very clear proofs for the 
harmonization of internal and external factors witnessed from the adoption of the VCL (2004). 
At the time of early 2000s, when we look at the model of competition agencies in the world 
(mainly developed countries) and in East Asia, most of them are independent agencies (being 
powerful as a ministry-level agency under the direct supervision of the Government or the 
State). This means that those competition authorities had very independent position and 
powerful status, which helps them a lot when handling competition cases involved by national 
champions or big worldwide groups with enormous market power. Competition itself is a very 
complicated issue and involves regulation of other sectorial agencies so independence of the 
competition agency is of great importance. 
 
On the surface, the Vietnam Competition Administration Department (VCAD, current Vietnam 
Competition Authority) was established as an affiliation to the MOT (now MOIT) with separate 
budget and seal. This was a “relative and progressive independence” in the context of 
Vietnam’s political and economic system from that time till now. Putting the VCAD under the 
MOT constrained its independence but the assignment of the agency head by the Prime Minister 
and the VCAD’s power to initiate any competition case itself supported its independent post. In 
this case, the restriction on the power of the competition agency reflected the internal site of 
“culture, practice and thinking” while the enhancement of the enforcement mission of the 
competition agency in investigating competition cases assured the independent agency model 
that was popular in the world. If the competition agency had been totally controlled by MOT 
(now MOIT), it would have been in “passive” mode. However, establishment of a ministry-
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level competition agency in Vietnam like other developed jurisdictions was impossible due to 
unique characteristics of the “socialist market-oriented economy” model. 
 
In short, the design of the VCAD at the time of adopting the VCL (2004) was actually a good 
combination of internal and external factors. No exact factor predominated as all those were 
kept in balance to fit the domestic panorama and also to meet with the world best practice.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter explored how the combination of internal and external factors in the enactment of 
the VCL (2004) were harmonized by Vietnamese policymakers. It is noteworthy that different 
from the cases of Indonesia or Thailand (those who adopted the antitrust act under the direct 
pressure from outside – namely the IMF as a solution to solving out the aftermath of the 
financial crisis in 1997), Vietnam came up with competition concepts and realized them via 
enacting the Competition Law under both internal and external driving forces. 
 
The harmonization was due to the fact that no internal or external factor was dominant and big 
enough to affect the decision on drafting and enacting the Competition Law. On the one hand, 
the actual context and needs of the domestic political economy made the high ranking leaders 
have no way to deny the importance of competition in operating the market economy. On the 
other hand, in the course of intermingling with globalization, the open door policy goes hand in 
hand with enforcing competition. Entering regional organizations like ASEAN or APEC and 
applying for WTO membership indirectly pushed Vietnam to build up competition policy 
including competition law. Not less importantly, the conditions included in the negotiation 
process as well as the implementation of the BTA between Vietnam and the US partially 
affected the enactment of the VCL (2004). 
 
Moreover, harmonization is evident in the process of drafting the law. The draft law was 
contributed to and commented on from a wide range of foreign experts on competition in 
developed jurisdictions or economies bearing certain resemblances with Vietnam. As 
competition was too new in Vietnam at that time, such opinions from the external experts were 
much welcome and are reflected in all 15 drafts of the law before being on the table of the 
National Assembly members. The main contents of the VCL (2004) and the model of enforcing 
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the law once again indicate the process of harmonization between the internal and the external 
driving forces in the enactment of the VCL (2004). 
 
The final section reviews all the key issues of the research and points out the core findings of 
this thesis. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Prior to conducting this research, one could ask whether it is necessary to turn back time and 
analyze what happened in the past and why and how it happened. Trying to ascertain which 
factors account for the enactment of the VCL (2004) is such an activity. As there have been a 
lot of comments and criticism over the outdated contents of the current VCL, understanding 
how the VCL came into being provides a platform for understanding how it can be changed. 
The Vietnamese Competition Authority is now very active in the ASEAN Experts Group on 
Competition (AEGC). It is very enthusiastic in sharing its experiences with other AMSs who 
have yet to introduce a competition law. The outcomes of this research can be useful for 
policymakers in such countries. Moreover, as focused on at the beginning of the thesis, there is 
a real lack of literature on competition issues in Vietnam in general and the VCL (2004) in 
particular. This is the case even though the role of competition in national economic 
development is an incredibly important area of study for transitional economies like Vietnam. 
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 marking the end of Cold War dominated by two 
blocks – socialist and capitalists, a number a transitional economies have attracted the interest 
of many researchers. There are a lot of stories relating to the “transformation” of economies in 
transition due to their unique features and economic and political backgrounds. Vietnam is 
among those countries. Coming out of two wars for a long period in its contemporary history of 
development (from 1945 to 1975) and following the communist direction, Vietnam had very 
special socio-economic conditions as well as political ideology. Since Doimoi and the series of 
significant economic reforms that followed, Vietnam has achieved a good level of economic 
development and transformation. At the same time, the reformed political thinking focused on 
the comprehensive foreign policy of “multilateralization, diversification and international 
economic integration”. Vietnam has witnessed big changes in external economic relations over 
the past few decades. 
 
In particular, policymakers and politicians began to understand the shortcomings of the 
centrally planned economy and found ways to approach the market economy with socialist 
orientation. As advocated by developed countries and academic research, competition plays a 
very pivotal role in building the market economy. In order to preserve competition in the 
market, a comprehensive competition policy with the core as a competition law supported by a 
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set of other sector regulatory laws is necessary. This thesis has shown, however, that it is really 
tough to build up an effective competition law to meet the fundamental technical requirements 
and even tougher to build a good one that well reflect the actual needs of the economy in 
transitional societies so that when implemented the competition law can be beneficial for the 
operation of the economy. In light of ongoing State subsidy and protectionism in Vietnam, 
competition has encountered lots of obstacles and challenges. 
 
The globalization of competition laws has meant “over forty formerly communist or socialist 
states have enacted new competition laws or augmented older competition statutes since 1975 
[till 2001]”.147 This phenomenon, on the one hand, indicates the tendency of world market 
evolution with increasing recognition of competition as the key element of the market 
mechanism. Countries who used to follow a socialist command economy are now also keeping 
updated and cannot stay outside the game any longer. On the other hand, an increasing number 
of cross border anticompetitive cases drove countries over the world to converge and harmonize 
more and more. Competition law, a legal instrument to regulate competition in the domestic 
economy, then ensures competitiveness of national champions in the fight against foreign 
competitors. 
 
There are different ways of considering the adoption of a competition bill to promote business 
activities in the market. First, competition might be negated and explained by this argument: “A 
transition economy might use a variety of techniques to increase the role of competition as a 
means for governing economic activity. In the full set of possible competition policy tools, 
antitrust enforcement might not always be the principal instrument.”148 In other cases, it goes 
like this: “Developing countries and economies in transition tend to be more vulnerable to anti-
competitive practices… For these countries, it is especially beneficial to learn from other 
countries’ experiences”.149 
 
Vietnam was also at the crossroad when deciding to enact a competition law during early 2000s. 
Obviously, the Party, the State and the Government were gradually aware of the role of 
competition in the process of operating the market mechanism in the economy. They also 
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acknowledged the threats of opening the market and the prices of international economic 
integration. Vietnam had “closed the door” for ages and lagged behind the world for such a long 
time. Doimoi confirmed the open policy of the whole country for the first time. At this point, 
the bad performance of the national economy (low efficiency, weaknesses of enterprises 
working in the public sector, the negative effects of state intervention in economic activities, 
and so on) was the key impetus for economic reform in general and for constructing a legal 
framework to control monopolies in the market in particular. 
 
At the same time, originating from the actual needs of “being friends” and “making friends” 
with all countries in the international community, Vietnam joined regional organizations, 
normalized relations with the US – the giant on the world economic and political arena, and 
applied for membership in the WTO – the biggest trade playing field for countries around the 
globe. At this point, external driving forces pushed Vietnam toward an open market, to 
liberalize trade and reform the legal system whether in formal commitments or through indirect 
ways. This required Vietnam to build up a competition regime with the immediate task of that 
time being enacting a competition law. 
 
The enactment of the VCL (2004) is a harmonization of internal and external factors. Both the 
economic and political backdrops of the country were supportive for the enactment while the 
enactment also met with the requirements of certain partners though in an indirect manner. 
External driving forces are therefore evident in the internal driving forces and vice versa. For 
example, Vietnam would desire to integrate into the world economy to increase the 
competitiveness of the entire economy. In turn, in the process of Vietnam’s international 
economic integration, foreign partners also required Vietnam to control monopolies and 
facilitate competition in the market. At this point, the actual needs and the outside demand are 
intertwined. Harmonization of these forces however has not been an easy process. It has taken 
great effort of the relevant parties to draft the law in a way that incorporates all domestic and 
international comments while still keeping with the direction of the highest leading bodies. 
 
Competition was placed high on the agenda of ASEAN, the OECD, APEC, UNCTAD, and 
EATOP. It has been included in almost all modern FTAs and RTAs in recent years. Vietnam 
falls among the first four countries in the ASEAN region to enact a competition law. Therefore, 
besides bringing competition concepts into economic life in response to requisite demands for 
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facilitating business competition, Vietnam was also very “integrated” and “active” when 
deciding to promulgate the VCL (2004).  
 
“A competition law is an important tool for creating competitive conditions, yet the creation of 
a workable competition law is not an easy endeavour”.150 This thesis has shown just how 
complicated and challenging that process can be by illustrating the convergence, divergence and 
harmonization of internal and external forces promoting regulatory change in competition law. 
Further studies should pursue comprehensive and in-depth works digging down into the case 
studies of harmonizing the internal and external factors in the contents of the VCL (2004) or the 
practice of enforcing that law as well as seeking better understanding of how developing or 
transitional economies introduce competition laws that both meet the requirements of domestic 
interests and levels of institutional development while also meeting the requirements for 
international standards of competition to facilitate trade and regional integration. 
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